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The Bottom of the Iceberg: 
Unpublished Opinions 
 
HON. DONNA S. STROUD* 
ABSTRACT 
Most federal intermediate appellate court opinions are “unpublished”—
they have no precedential value, even though they are readily available in 
online databases.  Most research on judicial behavior is based on analyses 
of published opinions.  If a court’s decisions not to publish are based on 
factors relevant to behavioral research, exclusion of unpublished opinions 
may skew the results.  Currently, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit has the lowest percentage of unpublished opinions, while 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has one of the 
highest rates of unpublished opinions.  Do the differences in publication 
rates demonstrate anything about the reasons that judges decide not to 
publish cases, and how do these reasons inform selection of cases for 
research on the courts?  This Article concludes that the publication 
decision itself is a form of judicial behavior that is worthy of study, and 
that unpublished opinions should be considered in most research on the 
federal appellate courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Compromise is not a bad word for every institution, whether in Congress 
or corporate governance or a court.”  
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III1 
 
It is a Thursday afternoon, near the end of a busy week.  Judge Smith 
is in his chambers, looking through the stack of draft opinions on his desk.  
Filing day is Monday, and he has several difficult cases that he is preparing 
to file.  One of these is a draft opinion from Judge Jones for the ABC Inc. v. 
First Bank case.2  Judge Smith has seriously considered writing a 
dissenting opinion in the case; he believes that Judge Jones’s draft opinion 
relies on several cases that it should not have relied on, and unless it is 
substantially revised, the opinion may cause additional confusion in the 
case law interpreting the statute that is the subject of the draft.  Judge Smith 
has already discussed his concerns with Judge Jones, and she disagrees 
with his analysis of the cases.  Judge Vinson, the third judge on the panel, 
has already concurred with Judge Jones’s draft and is not inclined to 
reconsider his concurrence.  Judge Smith had been hopeful that this case 
would assist the trial courts and attorneys in dealing with cases that arise 
under this statute, since it has been an area of some dispute.  This draft, 
however, might simply make matters worse. 
But writing a full opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part 
would take far more time, and this case is already past the court’s usual 
 
 1. Telephone Interview with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 2, 2013). 
 2. This is a fictional case, made up for purposes of this illustration, considered by 
fictional judges. 
2
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filing deadline.  Judge Smith gets some coffee and walks down to Judge 
Jones’s chambers.  “Look, Mary, I have been thinking about our discussion 
the other day regarding the ABC Inc. v. First Bank case.  I just can’t 
concur with the rationale, but I can’t get a dissent done right now.  I’m OK 
with the result in this case, though—would you consider just filing it 
unpublished?  If you will, I’ll concur in result only and we’ll be done.”  
“Sure, Tom.  I know you’ve been swamped with those tax cases.  I’ll 
designate it unpublished and we can get it filed on Monday,” Judge Jones 
replies.  Judge Smith goes back to his chambers, relieved to have one more 
case out of the way.  Perhaps he can get his own cases finished now. 
What just happened here?  All courts that allow judges to issue 
unpublished opinions have rules that provide guidance or direction on 
when cases should be designated as “unpublished.”3  None of the rules 
include as a reason for issuing unpublished opinions that the judge does not 
have time to write a dissent before the filing deadline.  The issue presented 
by the ABC Inc. case is not one that is clearly controlled by existing law, or 
Judge Smith would not have needed to dissent at all.  Actually, if he had 
written it, his dissent might have made an important contribution to the 
law. 
The ABC Inc. case and the judges in this scenario are all fictional.  But 
similar scenarios do happen in our appellate courts.  There is truly no way 
to know precisely how often it happens, and there is no way to determine 
that it happens in any particular case.  Under local rules of court and the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, judges may not discuss their panel deliberations 
and decision-making processes in a particular case with those outside the 
court.4  No records of such things are made or kept, but all appellate judges 
have the experience of working with other judges to reach resolutions of 
 
 3.  “Published” cases are those designated by the issuing court to be physically 
published in official reporter books and, more importantly, to have precedential value.  With 
the advent of electronic databases and the Internet, the practical physical or financial 
constraints on publication of opinions are gone, and electronic research enables attorneys to 
research all cases instantaneously, but the old terminology remains.  Thus, the term 
“unpublished” is a bit misleading, since cases designated as “unpublished” are actually 
published electronically, even though they are not physically published in the official 
Federal Reporter books.  See Adam Liptak, Courts Write Decisions That Elude Long View, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2015, at A10 (noting that “technology has turned the term ‘unpublished’ 
into a misnomer”).  Ironically, in 2001, Thomson West began publishing the “unpublished” 
federal opinions in books in the Federal Appendix. 
 4. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011); see also 
Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1903 
(2009) (“[J]udicial decisionmaking takes place in a closed environment and deliberating 
judges are bound by propriety and ethics to maintain confidentiality.”). 
3
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cases.  Statistics clearly demonstrate that the vast majority of those 
deliberations now result in the issuance of an unpublished opinion.5  Some 
judges have written about and discussed their own experiences and beliefs 
on how judges make decisions about publication and the advantages or 
disadvantages of unpublished opinions.6  Other researchers have sought to 
identify factors that determine publication decisions based on statistical 
analysis of the cases themselves and the characteristics of the court and 
judges.7 
This Article examines the reasons that judges report for designating 
cases as “unpublished,” using interviews and surveys of judges on the 
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, along 
with examination of their rules and customary practices. It also notes 
similar practices in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, based on my own 
observations as a judge on the court. 
I. THE DEBATE REGARDING UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS 
There has been much debate about whether courts should designate 
cases as “unpublished,” and whether these unpublished cases should be 
citable.8  This debate extends to the potential jurisprudential and practical 
ramifications of excluding unpublished opinions from the development of 
the common law.9  For many judges, lawyers, law professors, and others in 
 
 5. From September 30, 2012, to September 30, 2013, the federal courts of appeals, 
excluding the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, issued 88.2% of their 
opinions as unpublished opinions.  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR supp. tbl.S-3 
(2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/tables/S03Sep13. 
pdf.  This number decreased slightly during the twelve-month period ending on September 
30, 2014.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.B-12 (2014), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2014/appendices/B12Sep14.pdf. 
 6. In Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, Judge Richard S. Arnold of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit discusses his thoughts on unpublished 
opinions as a judge “who has produced probably hundreds of unpublished opinions, but has 
always felt uneasy about it.”  Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219, 219 (1999). 
 7. See generally Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4; Deborah Jones Merritt & James 
J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001). 
 8. See generally David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the 
Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2005).  
 9. See id. at 1668–69 (discussing the debate on unpublished opinions and the questions 
raised by the development of a “two-track” system for cases in the federal courts).  Vladeck 
4
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the legal profession, this debate has been quite intense and has persisted for 
many years.10 
While this Article acknowledges that debate, the Article’s purpose is 
not to examine the wisdom of the federal courts’ practices of issuing 
unpublished opinions.11  Instead, the purpose is to examine how judges 
 
and Gulati describe the “Track One” and “Track Two” models of opinions in the federal 
courts: 
[In] “Track One” cases . . . . [e]ach case is reviewed by three Article III 
judges; they read the briefs, study the record, hear oral argument, and deliberate 
with their colleagues to reach a decision.  Each case is resolved in a carefully 
crafted opinion identifying the author and the concurrence (or dissent) of the other 
participating judges. 
Id. at 1668.  On the other hand, unpublished opinions travel the “Track Two” or “black box” 
track, where they 
are culled early in the appellate process (sometimes even before briefing) for 
disposition without argument.  Many are processed by staff attorneys or court-
employed legal assistants rather than Article III judges.  Although Article III 
judges oversee the process, review recommendations, and ultimately “decide” the 
cases, our sense is that, in general, judges do not read the briefs, review the record, 
or independently research the law.  Instead, they rely on staff assistants to provide 
them with both an even-handed, balanced appraisal of the case and a proposed 
disposition. 
Id. at 1669.  The debate regarding how unpublished opinions should be used has even 
divided the judiciary.  See Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial 
Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2007) (“The period 
since 2002 has seen a bitter dispute over the apparently trivial issue of a proposed and 
eventually enacted uniform citation rule splitting the ranks of the federal judiciary . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
 10. See generally Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und 
Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005) 
(describing the intense debate on the treatment of unpublished opinions from the author’s 
perspective as reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure).  Schiltz says: 
On the day that I became Reporter, the issue of unpublished opinions was the 
most controversial issue on the Advisory Committee’s agenda.  Eight years later, 
the issue of unpublished opinions continues to be the most controversial issue on 
the Advisory Committee’s agenda.  I have devoted more attention to the 
unpublished-opinions issue than to all of the other issues the Advisory Committee 
has faced—combined.  At times, I have devoted more attention to the 
unpublished-opinions issue than to all of my children—combined.  An Advisory 
Committee member once joked that my obituary would be unpublished. 
Id. at 1429–30 (footnote omitted). 
 11. Further, my purpose is not to examine the wisdom of any intermediate appellate 
court in the United States in issuing unpublished opinions.  The intermediate appellate 
courts of the states issue “unpublished” or nonprecedential opinions as well, but this Article 
focuses on the federal courts, with a particular focus on the Fourth and Seventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals.  Donald R. Songer noted in 1990: 
5
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themselves understand and practice the decision to designate a case as 
published or unpublished.  The federal circuits each have formal rules that 
address the publication of opinions, but these rules vary, and the 
publication rates also vary, although the variance in publication rates does 
not seem to be directly related to the plain text of the rules.12  The real 
reasons for designating cases as unpublished may also reveal just as much 
useful information for analysis of the courts as the statistical analysis of the 
published cases. 
Although the reasons that judges decide to publish cases may be 
important for many reasons, this Article focuses on how these publication 
decisions may affect statistical research on the courts.  We must rely on the 
work product of the courts—the opinions—to examine or analyze the work 
of the courts or of a particular judge, and that is exactly what many 
researchers do.13  If judicial-behavior researchers ignore unpublished cases, 
 
[T]here is no consensus on the wisdom of the practice of nonpublication.  Behind 
the normative debate over nonpublication are conflicting views as to whether or 
not the formal criteria governing publication provide an accurate description in 
fact of which cases are selected to be unpublished.  There is little controversy over 
the abstract notion that cases with no precedential value, no significance for public 
policy, and in which the existence of clear precedents give judges no discretion in 
decisionmaking should not be published.  The important controversy rages over 
whether the cases currently designated for nonpublication status are in fact such 
cases. 
Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: 
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 309 (1990). 
 12. See id. at 313.  Even in 1990, Songer, who compiled one of the most frequently 
used case databases, concluded that the official rules regarding unpublished opinions did not 
seem to explain the courts’ publication practices.  See id.  After examining the published 
and unpublished cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits in 1986, he noted that “[t]he data presented . . . clearly demonstrate that the official 
criteria for publication do not provide an adequate description of the differences in practice 
between decisions which are published and those which are not.”  Id.  He further explained: 
A significant number of the unpublished decisions of the courts of appeals appear 
to involve cases which are non-routine, sometimes politically significant, and 
which are nonconsensual appeals which present the judges on the panel hearing 
the appeal with an opportunity to exercise substantial discretion in their 
decisionmaking.  The data suggest that for a number of the unpublished decisions 
the outcome of the case might have been different if heard by a different panel of 
judges.  For other cases the data suggest that while the outcome might have been 
the same, a different panel would have been likely to issue a published opinion. 
Id.; see also Merritt & Brudney, supra note 7, at 72 (“Each court has formal rules governing 
the publication of opinions, but those standards fail to account for variations in publication.  
Despite substantial overlap among circuit rules, publication rates differ widely among courts 
and even among individual judges.”). 
 13. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1906–07 (describing the difficulties of 
empirical analysis of the opinions of the federal courts, including the inability of this 
6
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they may be omitting relevant information on the behavior of courts.  The 
assumption that every unpublished case is so designated because it is 
entirely uncontroversial or has nothing to add to the development of the 
law is simply incorrect.14  Even the process of determining whether a 
particular case should be published is a type of judicial decision making, 
independent of the substantive issues raised by a case, which could be 
relevant to research on courts’ behavior and work. 
The decision on publication is not the only decision process by courts 
that is hidden from public view.  The Supreme Court and highest state 
appellate courts do not provide explanations for denying petitions for 
 
analysis to take many aspects of the decision-making process into account, and the 
methodological and conceptual challenges presented by these studies). 
 14. Judges themselves are well aware of this fact.  See Arnold, supra note 6, at 224 
(noting that “many cases with obvious legal importance are being decided by unpublished 
opinions”).  
  On rare occasions, the United States Supreme Court has commented on the obvious 
importance of an unpublished opinion.  In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 
418 (1993), the Court noted, “[w]e deem it remarkable and unusual that although the Court 
of Appeals affirmed a judgment that an Act of Congress was unconstitutional as applied, the 
court found it appropriate to announce its judgment in an unpublished per curiam opinion.”  
Id. at 425 n.3; see also Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (describing the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jackson v. Felkner, 389 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 2010) as 
“inexplicable as it is unexplained”). 
  Another recent example is Justice Thomas’s dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, from 
the denial of certiorari in a case from the Fourth Circuit, Plumley v. Austin, 135 S. Ct. 828 
(2015) (mem.).  In Plumley, Justice Thomas noted: 
True enough, the decision below is unpublished and therefore lacks precedential 
force in the Fourth Circuit.  But that in itself is yet another disturbing aspect of the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision, and yet another reason to grant review.  The Court of 
Appeals had full briefing and argument on Austin’s claim of judicial 
vindictiveness.  It analyzed the claim in a 39-page opinion written over a dissent.  
By any standard—and certainly by the Fourth Circuit’s own—this decision should 
have been published.  The Fourth Circuit’s Local Rule 36(a) provides that 
opinions will be published only if they satisfy one or more of five standards of 
publication.  The opinion in this case met at least three of them: it 
“establishe[d] . . . a rule of law within th[at] Circuit,” “involve[d] a legal issue of 
continuing public interest,” and “create[d] a conflict with a decision in another 
circuit.”  It is hard to imagine a reason that the Court of Appeals would not have 
published this opinion except to avoid creating binding law for the Circuit.   
Id. at 831 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)(i), (ii), (v)). 
  For an excellent description of the increased number of unpublished cases since 
1970 and a statistical analysis of publication practices in multiple federal circuits, including 
statistics that illustrate the importance of many unpublished opinions from other courts’ 
citation to those opinions and from the Supreme Court’s review of unpublished opinions, 
see Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199 (2001). 
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certiorari, even though the vast majority of these petitions are denied 
review.15  Some courts issue brief memorandum opinions, summary 
affirmances, or brief per curiam opinions that do not contain any legal 
analysis.16  In those cases, the court’s decision-making process is totally 
hidden.  But although unpublished opinions are “unpublished” in that they 
have no precedential value, they are readily available to read.  They are not 
hidden, and although some things cannot be seen, such as Judge Smith’s 
reasons for concurring in result only, there is some information that we can 
see in the unpublished opinion.  Many unpublished opinions also include a 
 
 15. In the October Term 2012, 7509 cases were filed in the Supreme Court, but the 
Court granted review by certiorari in only 92 of those cases.  See U.S. SUPREME COURT, 
JOURNAL OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: OCTOBER TERM 2012 II (2013), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/jnl12.pdf.  In recent years, petitions have been 
granted at rates ranging from about 1% to 5%.  See History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. 
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_petitions_for_certiorari_ 
2 (last visited May 11, 2015).  The votes of at least four of the nine justices are required for 
the Court to grant certiorari.  See PUB. INFO. OFFICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., A 
REPORTER’S GUIDE TO APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 3 (Nov. 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/reportersguide.pdf.  The 
United States Supreme Court has explained: 
[A] denial of certiorari means only that, for one reason or another which is seldom 
disclosed, and not infrequently for conflicting reasons which may have nothing to 
do with the merits and certainly may have nothing to do with any view of the 
merits taken by a majority of the Court, there were not four members of the Court 
who thought the case should be heard. 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 492 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).   
  A Supreme Court Justice may dissent from the denial of certiorari, so while the 
reasons that a dissenting Justice would have granted certiorari are known, the reasons that 
the other Justices did not grant certiorari normally remain a mystery.  For example, in Smith 
v. United States, 502 U.S. 1017 (1991), Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices O’Connor and 
Souter, dissented from the Court’s denial of certiorari, noting that in an unpublished 
opinion, the Fourth Circuit had “reviewed [Smith’s] conviction in a manner inconsistent 
with this Court’s precedents on the application of harmless-error analysis.”  Id. at 1017 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Further, Justice Blackmun commented in a footnote that “[t]he 
fact that the Court of Appeals’ opinion is unpublished is irrelevant.  Nonpublication must 
not be a convenient means to prevent review.  An unpublished opinion may have a lingering 
effect in the Circuit and surely is as important to the parties concerned as is a published 
opinion.”  Id. at 1020 n.*.  Does this footnote hint at one of the unstated reasons that the 
majority of the Court voted to deny certiorari?  There is no way to know, but sometimes 
dissenters tend to address the positions of the majority via an oblique comment.  See id.  Yet 
the Supreme Court has granted review of a number of unpublished opinions, so the 
unpublished status of a case certainly does not always protect an opinion from review.  See 
Hannon, supra note 14, app. A at 241–50 (listing a sample of eighty-three unpublished 
opinions reviewed by the Supreme Court from 1974 to 2000). 
 16. See Elizabeth M. Horton, Comment, Selective Publication and the Authority of 
Precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1693–94 (1995). 
8
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full legal analysis and differ from published opinions only in the 
designation as nonprecedential.17  Much of the information in an 
unpublished opinion is hidden only to the extent that researchers studying 
judicial behavior ignore it. 
The most frequently stated practical reason for high nonpublication 
rates is that it is necessary to deal with the courts’ increasing workloads.18  
The federal courts simply cannot issue a fully researched, well-written, 
precedential opinion in every single case; instead, they must allocate their 
time and effort to those cases that most need and deserve it.19  At least one 
federal court explicitly recognizes this workload concern in its Internal 
Operating Procedures (IOP): IOP 10 of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit begins with the recognition that “[t]he workload of 
the appellate courts precludes preparation of precedential opinions in all 
cases,” and notes that “[u]nnecessary precedential dispositions, with 
 
 17. Although they are officially nonprecedential, unpublished opinions are sometimes 
cited by later published opinions.  In addition, some argue that unpublished opinions may 
actually “make[] law the wrong way” when they “guide the opinions that follow, but 
troublingly, not as deliberately, and not nearly as openly, as precedential opinions do.”  
Brian Soucek, Copy-Paste Precedent, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 153, 154 (2012).  Soucek 
describes how portions of text from unpublished opinions regarding different interpretations 
of “social visibility” in asylum cases in the Second Circuit have been copied and pasted 
without acknowledgement in later published opinions, leading to error in the court’s 
analysis of this issue.  Id. at 158–61, 171 (discussing Romero v. Mukasey, 262 F. App’x 
328, 330, 333 (2d Cir. 2008) and noting subsequent decisions that cited Romero). 
 18. See Arnold, supra note 6, at 221 (“Why would the federal courts take such a step, 
seemingly so much at odds with traditional ways of adjudication?  The answer lies in one 
word, the same word that describes the most serious problem facing all our courts today: 
volume.”). 
 19. See Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 33 (2002) 
(statement of Hon. Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit), 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju80454.000/hju804540.HTM.  Kozinski 
states: 
Writing twenty opinions a year is like writing a law review article every two and a 
half weeks; joining forty opinions is like commenting on an article written by 
someone else nearly once every week.  It’s obvious just from the numbers that 
unpublished dispositions get written a lot faster—about one every other day.  It’s 
also obvious that explaining to the parties who wins, who loses and why takes far 
less time than preparing an opinion that will serve as precedent throughout the 
circuit and beyond.  We seldom review unpublished dispositions of other panels 
or take them en banc.  Not worrying about making law in 3800 unpublished 
dispositions frees us to concentrate on those decisions that will affect others 
besides the parties to the appeal. 
Id. 
9
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concomitant full opinions, only impede the rendering of decisions and the 
preparation of precedential opinions in cases which merit that effort.”20 
The process of selecting only the most meritorious cases for 
publication has been compared to emergency-room triage; patients with 
life-threatening conditions need to receive immediate treatment, while 
those who are not in danger will have to wait until medical personnel are 
available to assist them.21  But although case triage may be necessary, what 
standards do judges actually use to decide which cases need full treatment?  
In the emergency room, the medical standards for patient assessment are 
reasonably clear and uniformly applied: nurses gather personal information 
about the patient’s complaints and status and check temperatures, heart and 
respiratory rates, and blood pressures, and follow standards set by the 
hospital as to which patients need treatment first.  In the courtroom, 
however, no clear or uniform triage standards exist.  For many cases, most 
lawyers and judges would agree that publication is not needed, simply 
because the issues presented do not merit publication.  But in other cases, 
such as the fictional ABC Inc. v. First Bank case, the legal issue is actually 
a disputed one that needs to be addressed, but was not, due to workload 
considerations.22  Or, were there other hidden reasons as well? 
What about Judge Vinson in the ABC Inc. case?  Why will he not 
reconsider his position?  Perhaps he has strong ideological opposition to the 
approach that Judge Smith would like to take in the case.  Judge Vinson 
would prefer to let the law stand as it is, or even with a bit more confusion 
added by ABC Inc., because he does not want this case to establish a 
definitive interpretation of the statute at issue in the case.  Perhaps Judge 
Vinson believes that the law does need to be clarified, but thinks that the 
briefs in this case were poorly written and the court should wait for another 
opportunity to address the issue.  Maybe Judge Vinson is very busy and 
does not have time to reconsider.  In reality, each of the three judges on this 
panel may have an entirely different reason for not wanting this case to 
have precedential status.  Many different factors may be hidden in this one 
publication decision.23 
Lawyers, the media, the general public, law professors, law students, 
political scientists, psychologists, and other judges all examine, parse, 
criticize, praise, and analyze the details of cases issued by appellate courts 
at every level for many reasons.  The Supreme Court of the United States is 
naturally subjected to the most intense examination, given its position and 
 
 20. FED. CIR. I.O.P. 10(1). 
 21. See Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 8, at 1673. 
 22. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.  
 23. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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power.  Yet, the federal intermediate appellate courts are also closely 
examined, not just to learn the formal content of the law, but also to 
analyze judicial performance and to determine if judges are ruling in 
certain ways based on ideologies or other biases.  With life tenure, federal 
appellate judges tend to serve in their positions for a long time, and 
attorneys who practice before them are quite interested in predicting their 
predilections.24  Historically, nominees to the Supreme Court often come 
from the federal intermediate appellate bench, so their ideological 
orientations that are demonstrated at the intermediate appellate level will be 
microscopically examined if the judges are nominated to the Supreme 
Court.25  Because of their obligations under the Code of Judicial Conduct,26 
judges do not simply announce how they might rule on particular issues, 
but many people have reasons to try to predict how they might rule, using 
the judge’s prior opinions to make these predictions.  However, because of 
the tremendous number of opinions issued by the federal courts, it is 
physically impossible for one person to read and thoughtfully analyze 
 
 24. See Ahmed E. Taha, Judge Shopping: Testing Whether Judges’ Political 
Orientations Affect Case Filings, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1007, 1035 (2010).  Some research 
indicates that litigants’ decisions to file cases in a particular court are driven by beliefs about 
the court’s ideology: 
[T]he political orientations of U.S. district court judges are also important; the 
political orientation of federal district judges affects which cases are filed in 
federal courts.  Plaintiffs file more of certain types of lawsuits—such as product 
liability and motor vehicle personal injury suits—when the judges on a court are 
politically liberal rather than politically conservative.  This demonstrates that 
many litigants believe the political orientation of the trial judge can affect who 
wins.  Fewer plaintiffs seek relief in a court if they believe the judge is less likely 
to be sympathetic to their cases. 
Id. 
 25. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: 
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 33 (2004) [hereinafter 
Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice].  Choi and Gulati describe the 
usual “tournament” of Supreme Court confirmation: 
In step two of the current process, the president seems to narrow the candidate 
pool on the basis of likely votes on a key subset of political issues such as 
abortion, gay rights, affirmative action, sexual harassment, the death penalty, gun 
control, and federalism.  The candidate’s likely votes on this subset of key issues 
become a proxy for the nominee’s fuller range of future voting behavior.  And, as 
we know from newspaper reports of the recent fights over judicial nominations, 
the candidate’s judging record and personal life are magnified and scrutinized to 
discern all possible signals of future voting patterns. 
Id. (first citing Helen Dewar, GOP Presses for Votes on Judges, WASH. POST, July 30, 2003, 
at A4; then citing James Wensits, Chocola Supports Bush Court Nominee, S. BEND TRIB., 
Feb. 14, 2003, at D3). 
 26. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). 
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every single case.27  Researchers must use statistical analysis to find the 
answers to their questions, but to get a valid answer, the researchers must 
ask the right questions and use the right data. 
No matter how elegant a statistical analysis may be, it is only as good 
as its underlying data.  Therein lies the problem: even the simplest case 
produces very complex data.  First, the researcher must select the set of 
cases to study, and then, the cases must be read, classified, and coded, or 
reduced to a set of numbers that can be plugged into statistical formulas.28  
The researcher must determine whether the result in each case is considered 
ideologically “liberal” or “conservative” in a study of political orientation, 
or favorable or unfavorable to a particular interest or group, or whatever the 
relevant feature sought may be.  Studies of how frequently a judge’s 
opinions are cited and whether those citations are favorable or unfavorable 
must also characterize each citation.29  People may disagree on whether a 
particular result indicates a certain ideological position—the results of 
cases may depend upon procedural or jurisdictional rationales that actually 
have no relation to substantive issues or ideology.30  But beyond these 
 
 27. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1922–23 (describing the problems with 
selecting and coding cases for the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database, also known as the 
Songer Database, which has been used by many empiricists). 
 29. See Robert Anderson IV, Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial 
Quality in the United States Courts of Appeals, 76 MO. L. REV. 315, 316–17 (2011) 
(discussing empirical research based on citation counts).  Anderson determines that the 
omission of unpublished opinions in some studies should have no effect on the accuracy of 
the research if the researcher is “not . . . attempting to draw inferences about the precedents 
created in those dispositions.”  Id. at 372.  Anderson notes: 
[T]he very idea of a study of citations to unpublished opinions is, in a sense, a 
contradiction in terms, because unpublished decisions are generally not citable as 
precedent.  Thus, to the extent one wishes to study the quality of the legal 
reasoning that forms part of the body of precedent for later cases, the unpublished 
decisions are not relevant. 
Id. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 32.1).  Yet Anderson recognizes that if “one wishes to draw 
inferences about the dispositions of individual cases by the federal courts, citation analysis 
may prove less useful than other techniques.”  Id.  In addition, the legal analysis in an 
unpublished case may end up being used by another court without formal citation.  See 
Soucek, supra note 17, at 170–71.  Soucek examines the creation of a line of cases 
perpetuating a legal error in the Second Circuit, where copy/paste quotations of language 
from unpublished cases led to published cases, which “suggest[s] that to qualify as a social 
group, asylees must share a trait that is visible to society at large.”  Id. at 171.  Soucek 
concludes: “This is wrong.  But the deeper wrong is that the Second Circuit’s case law on 
this subject is guided by a system of ‘precedent’ that is itself not visible . . . . Before now, it 
has not been recognized or understood, and even now, it operates in ways almost entirely 
unseen.”  Id. 
 30. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1925. 
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difficulties that arise even in the most meticulous research, the first inquiry 
looks at which cases will be included in the dataset.  If some are excluded, 
what is the reason for their exclusion?31  Will the exclusion of these cases 
leave out meaningful data and result in the wrong conclusions?  To answer 
this question, we must first consider the actual reasons that the vast 
majority of federal appellate opinions are unpublished.  In addition, it may 
be necessary for the treatment of unpublished opinions to differ based on 
the court, since the published cases of a court that publishes a large 
percentage of its cases will more likely result in a representative sample of 
its work than those of a court that publishes a very small percentage. 
To answer these questions, I asked the judges who actually make these 
publication decisions every day to describe their experiences.  Part II of this 
Article describes the study procedure, which included surveys and 
interviews with Fourth and Seventh Circuit judges.  Part III describes some 
of the objective characteristics of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, 
including their caseloads, publication percentages, and official procedures 
and rules for making decisions regarding oral argument and publication.  
Part IV analyzes the factors that judges consider in making publication 
decisions.  Part V compares the judges’ responses at each court and 
describes how the culture of each court creates and affects the court’s 
publication practices.  The final Part presents my conclusions regarding the 
potential importance and use of unpublished opinions in research on 
judicial behavior based on the way that judges make decisions regarding 
publication. 
II. STUDY PROCEDURE 
Although each court has its own official rules and procedures that 
address the publication of opinions, these rules do not assist in 
understanding how judges actually make the publication decision.  While 
many have speculated about the various reasons that certain opinions are 
unpublished, the literature has not addressed in detail how individual 
judges make the publication decision.  
As a practical matter, the publication decision is made almost entirely 
by the authoring judge, and only nominally by the panel.  As one judge put 
 
 31. As Edwards and Livermore note, “[p]ublished decisions as a sample of total 
decisions are far from random . . . and these cases typically involve more straightforward 
applications of law.  However, they still dispose of appeals on the merits and offer 
information on “a court’s adherence to precedent.”  Id. at 1923.  Edwards and Livermore 
conclude that “any assessment of the work of the courts of appeals that does not include 
unpublished decisions cannot be seen as complete.”  Id. 
13
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it, “publication is a very individual decision.”32  Although the deliberative 
processes are hidden from the public, we know that in recent years, the rate 
of published opinions from the Fourth Circuit has been the lowest among 
the federal courts of appeals, while the Seventh Circuit’s rate of published 
opinions has been the highest.33  Because of this difference in publication 
rates, I believed that a comparison of the decision processes regarding 
publication at these two courts could shed light on how judges make their 
publication decisions. 
Each court has essentially three levels of rules that may influence 
publication decisions.34  First, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
apply to all federal courts.35  The next level of rules is the internal 
procedures of each court, which includes written rules adopted by each 
court.  The last level is the unwritten culture—the customs and traditions 
that each court uses in making these decisions.  At the most basic and more 
inscrutable level, these decisions are made by each individual judge based 
on many factors.  This Article examines the unwritten rules and the ways in 
which judges actually make their publication decisions. 
A. Methods 
Research on people always has its difficulties, but research on the 
personal thoughts and motivations of federal judges presents far more than 
the usual challenges.  The first challenge is access: federal judges are not 
readily accessible.36  Federal judges are scattered all over the country, and 
 
 32. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill. 
(Nov. 3, 2013). 
  I promised all of my interview or survey subjects that I would not identify them, 
either directly or indirectly, without specific permission provided after review of any quote 
or comment used in this Article.  Any information about the subject that I was able to 
furnish consistent with my promise of anonymity can be found in the text surrounding the 
various quotes or comments. 
 33. See Orin Kerr, Rates of Unpublished Opinions in the Different Circuits—And 
Especially the Fourth Circuit, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 8, 2011, 12:53 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2011/09/08/rates-of-unpublished-opinions-in-the-different-circuits-and-
especially-the-fourth-circuit/. 
 34. I will refer to this process as the publication decision, not the nonpublication 
decision, although they are both the same.  Since the vast majority of cases are now 
unpublished, I believe that judges tend to view the decision as an affirmative decision to 
publish, almost acknowledging a default of nonpublication. 
 35. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a)(i) (providing that “[a] court may not prohibit or restrict the 
citation of federal judicial opinions . . . that have been . . . designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not 
for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like”). 
 36. I was fortunate to have access to the judges as a fellow appellate judge and based on 
my association with the Duke Law School Judicial Studies Program. 
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they are very busy.  I asked the current active or senior-status judges on the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits to participate in either a written survey, a 
telephone interview, or a personal interview, as their schedules permitted.  I 
also interviewed the general counsel to the circuit executives and clerks of 
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits.  I conducted the interviews in person 
either at each circuit’s main courthouse—in Chicago for the Seventh 
Circuit, and in Richmond for the Fourth Circuit—or at the judges’ home-
state offices.  Interviews were not recorded, because I believed that fewer 
judges would be willing to participate in recorded interviews.  I took notes 
during each interview and did my best to record any direct quotes that I 
have used in this Article.  Any direct quotes of this type that are attributed 
to a particular person were also reviewed by the particular judge or 
interview subject prior to publication of this Article to ensure accuracy.37  I 
was not able to interview or obtain information from all of the judges on 
these courts, but I was able to talk to nearly half of the judges on the Fourth 
Circuit, and about a third of the active judges on the Seventh Circuit.  I 
developed questions based on my experience as a judge and based on the 
existing literature relating to nonpublication, and I asked the judges if there 
were additional factors that influence their publication decisions that I had 
not mentioned.  In addition to conducting interviews, I observed sessions of 
oral argument at both courts.38 
Based on the current literature and on the surveys and conversations 
with the judges that I interviewed, I have attempted to identify the factors 
that judges actually consider in deciding whether to publish and how these 
judges vary in their decision processes.  Thus, my conclusions are based 
primarily on self-reporting by the judges—something that would no doubt 
be frowned upon by many empirical researchers.39 
But what aspect of human behavior can be studied without asking the 
people being studied for their own thoughts on the question?  Certainly, 
research should go far beyond just asking a question and taking their word 
 
 37. However, in the event that any quotes used in this Article are inaccurate in any way, 
the responsibility is entirely mine.  
 38. On a personal note, I would like to express my gratitude to all of the judges and 
personnel at each court, all of whom were so gracious in spending their valuable time on 
this study and so welcoming to my visits.  Judges normally do not have the time or 
opportunity to visit courts outside of their own jurisdictions in this way, and having the 
chance to examine in some detail how these other courts work was simply a wonderful 
educational experience for me as a judge. 
 39. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 57–58 (2013) (“The premise is sound only if judges 
are introspective, only if introspection enables a judge to dredge up from the depths of his 
unconscious the full array of influences on his exercise of discretion, and only if judges are 
candid in their self-reporting.  None of these assumptions is plausible.”). 
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for it, but asking these questions is a necessary part of research and may 
assist future research.  The judges that I interviewed appeared to consider 
and answer the questions in a genuinely introspective and candid manner, 
although I have no way of knowing if they truly dredged up all of the 
influences in the depths of their unconscious minds.40 
The motivations and experiences reported by federal judges cannot be 
entirely irrelevant or unworthy of study.  Judges have a long tradition of 
introspection as to how they make decisions,41 and this sort of introspection 
has contributed to most of our literature on theories of judicial behavior, 
including the nine theories of judicial behavior examined in Judge Posner’s 
book, How Judges Think,42 as well as Judge Posner’s own theory of 
pragmatic judging.  Judicial decision-making is simply too complex to be 
fully explained by either purely statistical empirical analysis or by purely 
subjective self-reporting,43 but taken together, I believe that each type of 
research may inform the other and contribute to the accuracy and 
completeness of the end results of each form of study.  Given the lack of 
research that asks the judges themselves to explain their actions, I have 
attempted to give judges this opportunity. 
In the same vein, I would be remiss in this study not to reveal my own 
background as a judge and the frame of reference I have from my 
 
 40. See id.   
 41. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).  This 
work is perhaps the classic text of judicial introspection.  Justice Cardozo ponders these 
questions: 
What is it that I do when I decide a case?  To what sources of information do I 
appeal for guidance?  In what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the 
result?  In what proportions ought they to contribute?  If a precedent is applicable, 
when do I refuse to follow it?  If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the 
rule that will make a precedent for the future?  If I am seeking logical consistency, 
the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it?  At what point shall 
the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration of the 
social welfare, by my own or the common standards of justice and morals? 
Id. 
 42. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19 (2008) (noting possible internal 
reasons that judges act and rule as they do).  These theories are “the attitudinal, the strategic, 
the sociological, the psychological, the economic, the organizational, the pragmatic, the 
phenomenological, and, of course, what I am calling the legalist theory.”  Id. 
 43. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 57–58.  Justice Cardozo also acknowledged: 
A richer scholarship than mine is requisite to do the work aright.  But until that 
scholarship is found and enlists itself in the task, there may be a passing interest in 
an attempt to uncover the nature of the process by one who is himself an active 
agent, day by day, in keeping the process alive.  That must be my apology for 
these introspective searchings of the spirit. 
CARDOZO, supra note 41, at 13. 
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experience as an appellate judge.  Since 2007, I have served as a judge on 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which is the sole intermediate 
appellate court in North Carolina.44  The court has fifteen judges45—the 
same number of active judges on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.46 
Rule 30(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure is the 
court’s rule governing unpublished opinions.47  The rule was originally 
adopted in 1975 before the advent of electronic databases, when all cases 
had to be published in physical books.  It provides that the purpose of the 
rule is to “minimize the cost of publication and of providing storage space 
for the published reports” and that “[i]f the panel that hears the case 
determines that the appeal involves no new legal principles and that an 
opinion, if published, would have no value as a precedent, it may direct that 
no opinion be published.”48 
 
 44. See Court of Appeals of North Carolina, N.C. CT. SYS., http://www.nccourts.org/ 
courts/appellate/appeal/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2015). 
 45. See NC Court of Appeals Judges, N.C. CT. SYS., http://appellate.nccourts.org/ 
Bios/?c=2 (last visited Apr. 29, 2015). 
 46. See List of Judges of the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www. 
ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/pdfs/list-of-judges-of-the-court.pdf?sfvrsn=0 (last visited Apr. 29, 
2015). 
  To provide a sense of the workload of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in 
2013, 1474 appeals were filed with our court, and we issued 1346 opinions.   Data 
Compilation by Marcos DeSouza, Director of Information Systems for the North Carolina 
Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals (on file with author).  The North 
Carolina Court of Appeals issues full opinions in all cases and does not use brief 
memorandum opinions that simply state a result.  The court also issues unpublished 
opinions.  In 2013, 63% of the court’s opinions were unpublished.  Id.  Of my own opinions 
issued in 2013, 37% were unpublished.  Id.   
 47. See N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e).  Lawyers today who have never had to use actual books 
for legal research may fail to appreciate the historical development of the nonpublication 
rules.  For a fascinating perspective, see the views of Judge Philip Nichols, Jr. in his article, 
published by the American University Law Review.  See Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective 
Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986).  Judge Nichols 
graduated from law school in 1932 and began his judicial career in 1964 on the United 
States Customs Court.  See History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1759 (last visited May 2, 2015).  He then served 
from 1966 to 1982 on the United States Court of Claims, and then on the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982, when that court was created.  Id.  
 48. N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e)(1).  Appellate Rule 30(e) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) In order to minimize the cost of publication and of providing storage space for 
the published reports, the Court of Appeals is not required to publish an opinion in 
every decided case.  If the panel that hears the case determines that the appeal 
involves no new legal principles and that an opinion, if published, would have no 
value as a precedent, it may direct that no opinion be published. 
. . . . 
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Each associate judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals has an 
executive assistant and two law clerks, and the chief judge has an executive 
assistant and three law clerks.49  The court also has an Office of Staff 
Counsel, which has ten attorneys.  In addition to assisting the court with 
petitions and motions, the court’s staff attorneys prepare drafts of opinions 
in some cases that are designated as “fast track” cases by the panel to 
which they are assigned.50  Most of these “fast track” cases are single-issue 
criminal appeals that are clearly controlled by existing law or consist of 
“Anders brief” cases51 and are not orally argued, but are issued as 
unpublished opinions.  If any judge on the panel believes that a case 
designated as “fast track” needs additional consideration or oral argument, 
that judge can move the case from the fast-track panel to a regular panel for 
full consideration.  Staff counsel also assist in preparing drafts of opinions 
in certain “qualifying juvenile cases,”52 mostly involving terminations of 
parental rights, which are heard on an expedited schedule.  Although staff 
 
(3) An unpublished decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not 
constitute controlling legal authority.  Accordingly, citation of unpublished 
opinions in briefs, memoranda, and oral arguments in the trial and appellate 
divisions is disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing claim preclusion, 
issue preclusion, or the law of the case.  If a party believes, nevertheless, that an 
unpublished opinion has precedential value to a material issue in the case and that 
there is no published opinion that would serve as well, the party may cite the 
unpublished opinion if that party serves a copy thereof on all other parties in the 
case and on the court to which the citation is offered. . . . When citing an 
unpublished opinion, a party must indicate the opinion’s unpublished status. 
Id. R. 30(e)(1), (3). 
 49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-7 (2013) (providing that “each justice and judge of the 
appellate division is entitled to the services of not more than two research assistants, who 
must be graduates of an accredited law school”); see also Brenda D. Gibson, Staff Attorney, 
N.C. Court of Appeals, The Appellate Process and Jurisdiction (Sept. 9, 2004), 
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/200411GibsonAppellateProcess.pdf 
(noting that the chief judge of the court of appeals has three law clerks). 
 50. N.C. R. APP. P. 30(f)(2).  Appellate Rule 30(f)(2) provides in part: 
The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals may from time to time designate a panel 
to review any pending case, after all briefs are filed but before argument, for 
decision under this rule.  If all of the judges of the panel to which a pending 
appeal has been referred conclude that oral argument will not be of assistance to 
the Court, the case may be disposed of on the record and briefs. 
Id. 
 51. “Anders brief” cases, named after Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), are 
cases where appointed counsel believes, after a conscientious review of the record, that 
there is no merit to the appeal.  See id. at 744.  In these cases, counsel must provide the court 
with a brief that notes anything in the record that might reasonably support an appeal.  See 
id.  The court will then make a determination as to whether the appeal is frivolous.  See id. 
 52. See N.C. R. APP. P. 3.1. 
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counsel does prepare draft opinions for the Rule 3.1 cases,53 and although 
these cases are normally not argued, the panels meet and deliberate on 
these cases in the same manner as the cases that are on the regular calendar, 
and judges often end up writing these opinions in their own chambers. 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals does not hear oral argument on 
all cases; each panel designates which cases will be argued.  In 2013, 7.9% 
of the cases decided were orally argued.54  There is no official link between 
oral argument and publication on the North Carolina Court of Appeals like 
there is on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.55  Although orally argued 
cases are more likely to be published, some are not published, and some 
cases that were not orally argued are published.  Whether published or not, 
the author of each opinion is identified (except in the case of per curiam 
opinions, which are relatively rare56).  The decision to publish a case is 
almost always made by the authoring judge, although authoring judges 
often request that the other judges on the panel weigh in on whether the 
case should be published.  From my experience, there is rarely any 
disagreement about publication decisions.  The final decision to publish a 
case is made after the case has been considered by the entire panel after an 
opinion has been drafted.57 
Another unique feature of North Carolina law may also influence a 
judge’s decision to write a dissenting opinion, and perhaps might influence 
publication decisions on the North Carolina Court of Appeals: section 
7A-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides for an appeal of 
right to the Supreme Court of North Carolina from any court of appeals 
decision “[i]n which there is a dissent.”58  If there is a dissent, the losing 
party has a right of appeal to the state supreme court.59  If an opinion of the 
 
 53. These drafts come to the panel with a default “unpublished” designation, but the 
panel can, and sometimes does, change this to a “published” designation. 
 54. Data Compilation by Marcos DeSouza, supra note 46. 
 55. See infra notes 170–78 and accompanying text. 
 56. See Michael C. Gizzi & Stephen L. Wasby, Per Curiams Revisited: Addressing the 
Unsigned Opinion, 96 JUDICATURE 110, 115 (2012) (explaining that “the range of published 
dispositions issued per curiam extends from the very rare use in the D.C. Circuit (only 
0.3%) to as many as one-fourth (11th Cir.),” and that the average use in most federal courts 
of appeals is between 3% and 7%). 
 57. Although individual judges may differ in their approaches to publication decisions, 
I have sought to present a general description of this court’s procedures based on the rules 
and practices that are almost always followed by all of our judges.  I thank former Chief 
Judge John Martin and Judge Robert N. Hunter, Jr. of the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
for their input and review of my description of the court’s procedures to ensure that I have 
presented this accurately.  To the extent that I have not, the fault is entirely my own. 
 58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (2013). 
 59. Id. 
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court of appeals is unanimous, review by the supreme court is 
discretionary.60  In recent years, only a small percentage of petitions for 
discretionary review have been granted by the supreme court.  In fiscal year 
2013, the supreme court granted only 12.5% of petitions for discretionary 
review that were docketed in the court.61  Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., who 
served on the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina prior to his appointment to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, notes that section 7A-3062 gives a dissenting 
judge on the North Carolina Court of Appeals the power to grant a right of 
appeal to the state supreme court: “Because the North Carolina Supreme 
Court does not accept certified questions, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 in effect 
empowers a single dissenting judge to do something that the panel of 
judges cannot do—grant a right of appeal.”63  This statute may create a 
greater incentive for judges on the North Carolina Court of Appeals to 
exert the additional time and effort to write a dissenting opinion. 
B. Publication Decision Factors 
1.  Identification of Factors 
The literature arising from the debates on the federal courts’ adoption 
of Appellate Rule 32.1,64 which requires all federal circuits to allow 
citation of unpublished opinions, addresses many of the reasons that courts 
should or should not issue nonprecedential opinions.  It was also apparent 
to me from my experience as an appellate judge that judges often consider 
these same factors in making publication decisions, regardless of the 
specific language of the court’s rule on unpublished opinions.  Thus, I 
asked judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals whether 
and to what extent the following factors are relevant to their publication 
decision: 
 
 
 60. Id. § 7A-31.  
 61. From July 1, 2013, to June 30, 2014, the court considered 657 petitions for 
discretionary review.  See N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, STATISTICAL AND 
OPERATIONAL REPORT: APPELLATE COURTS 5 (2014), http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SR 
Planning/Documents/2013-14_appellate_courts_ statistical_and_operational_report.pdf.  Of 
those petitions, 82 were granted, 465 were denied, 80 were dismissed or withdrawn, and 30 
were disposed for reasons labeled “other.”  Id. 
 62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2). 
 63. Interview with Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C. (Nov. 26, 2013). 
 64. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.  
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1. The case lacks value as a legal precedent, since many prior 
cases have addressed the same issue; 
2. No new or novel legal issue is raised by the case; 
3. Efficiency (the need to get cases completed promptly); 
4. Heavy and repetitive caseload in a particular type of case; 
5. Pro se case with poor briefs on both sides, or only one brief 
was filed; 
6. Pro se cases with good briefs on each side; 
7. Poorly developed record on appeal; 
8. Great disparity in quality of legal representation between the 
parties; 
9. Lack of review (even by internal informal means) by entire 
court; a concern that the opinion may not represent the views 
of the entire court; 
10.  Agreement as to outcome but some disagreement among 
panel judges as to the rationale of opinion; the use of 
unpublished opinion avoids the need for dissenting or 
concurring opinion; 
11.  Authoring judge’s lack of experience or expertise in the legal 
subject matter of the case; 
12.  Avoidance of a bad precedent based on the particular facts of 
a case; 
13.  The case involves a controversial or politically charged issue. 
 
Table 1 lists my findings relating to these factors from interviews with 
judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Responses Regarding Publication Decision Factors 
 
 
Factor 
Number 
 
Factor Description 
 
Fourth Circuit 
(7 judges) 
 
Seventh Circuit 
(5 judges) 
 
 Jurisprudential Factors Yes No Yes No 
1 Lack of value as precedent 7 0 5 0 
2 No new or novel legal issue is 
raised by the case 
7 0 7 0 
3 Efficiency 2 5 0 7 
4 Repetitive/heavy caseload 6 1 5 0 
13 Controversial 3 4 2 3 
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 Case-Quality Factors Yes No Yes No 
5 Pro se case, bad briefs, or just 
one brief 
7 0 5 0 
12 Bad facts, hard case 5 2 3 2 
6 Pro se case, good briefs 4 3 7 0 
7 Poor record 5 2 4 1 
8 Legal-representation disparity 2 5 1 4 
      
 Collegiality Factors     
9 No review by entire court N/A  0 7 
10 Agreement as to outcome but 
not analysis 
3 4 0 5 
11 Lack of expertise 4 3 0 5 
 
Because some of these factors are very similar, I have grouped them, 
for purposes of analysis, into three overall categories: (1) jurisprudential 
factors (factors 1, 2, 3, 4, and 13), (2) case-quality factors (factors 5, 6, 7, 8, 
and 12), and (3) collegiality factors (factors 9, 10, and 11). 
The reason behind the grouping of some factors may be more obvious 
than others.  For example, the thirteenth factor, “the case involves a 
controversial or politically charged issue,” may not necessarily seem to fit 
under jurisprudential factors, but it fit best in this category based on my 
surveys and interviews of the judges.  Judges do not avoid publication of a 
case solely because of a potentially controversial issue, such as abortion; in 
a case that presents a novel issue, the controversial subject matter would 
not influence a judge to avoid publication.65  In fact, some judges are more 
inclined to publish a case that involves a controversial issue to avoid being 
perceived as sidestepping the issue.66  But many of these cases also present 
well-settled questions of law, and the mere fact that a case raises a 
controversial issue does not determine whether the case should be 
published.  After all, most federal judges have lifetime appointments and 
normally need not fear political repercussions from an opinion, even one 
that addresses a controversial issue.67 
 
 65. See infra Part II.B.1.a. 
 66. See infra Part II.B.1.a. 
 67. See How the Federal Courts Are Organized: Federal Judges and How They Get 
Appointed, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav 
=menu1&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/183 (last visited May 11, 2015); see also EPSTEIN ET 
AL., supra note 39, at 353.  Although life tenure means that they need not fear for loss of 
their judgeship, some judges may hope for promotion to the United States Supreme Court.  
See How the Federal Courts Are Organized, supra.  Currently, eight of the nine justices on 
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Another caveat is that in most cases, several of these factors are at 
play, but no single factor may be controlling.  In addition, the views of the 
judges on a panel may differ as to the importance of each factor in a 
particular case.  Some judges have never devoted much thought to the 
reasons on which they base publication decisions; rather, they have simply 
adopted the practices that are normally followed by their particular court.68  
As noted above, the authoring judge almost always has the final say, so the 
surveys and interviews primarily focused on how judges personally view 
these factors for opinions that they have authored. 
While the authoring judge almost always makes the final decision as 
to publication on both the Seventh and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, I 
asked what other individuals, if any, may influence the publication 
decision.  In particular, I asked about the contributions of other judges on 
the court, including judges on and off the panel, law clerks, staff counsel, 
and circuit executives.  Another influence to consider is the ability of the 
parties to request publication of an unpublished opinion.69 
As noted above, judges describe the publication decision as an 
individual decision in most cases, and the publication numbers tend to 
support this observation.70  Judges on the same court may publish at very 
different rates, even though they are all operating under the same written 
rules, with the same resources, and in the same court culture.  Because the 
publication decision is almost entirely discretionary for the author, there is 
no right or wrong publication percentage and no objective basis for 
claiming that any judge or court should publish more or less.  In addition, 
some judges change their views on publication over the course of their 
tenures on the court.71  Some new judges come to the appellate court with a 
preference to publish, only moving to a default position of unpublished 
over the years, while others come to the bench with a preference for 
nonpublication and begin to publish more frequently with more years of 
 
the Supreme Court previously served as judges on the federal courts of appeals.  See 
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 350–53 (describing the “auditioners,” judges whose 
characteristics of age, legal education, and other qualifications place them into a “promotion 
pool” from which appointment to the Supreme Court is more likely than it would be for the 
group of federal appellate judges as a whole).  Epstein writes that there are some indications 
that “auditioners” may have a tendency to “alter their judicial behavior in order to increase 
their chances.”  Id. at 363. 
 68. See infra Part II.B.1.c. 
 69. 4TH CIR. R. 36(b). 
 70. See supra Table 1. 
 71. See supra Table 1. 
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experience.72  Some judges claim that they stay about the same for their 
entire career.73 
a.  Jurisprudential Factors 
The five jurisprudential factors were identified as follows: the case 
lacks value as a legal precedent, since many prior cases have addressed the 
same issue (factor number one); no new or novel legal issue is raised by the 
case (factor number two); efficiency (the need to get cases completed 
promptly) (factor number three); heavy and repetitive caseload in a 
particular type of case (factor number four); and the case involves a 
controversial or politically charged issue (factor number thirteen).  The 
jurisprudential factors could also be characterized as workload factors, as a 
practical matter, but instead, judges tend to view these factors based mostly 
on their understanding of the need—or lack of a need—for more law on a 
particular issue.  These are the factors that are most commonly stated in the 
official written rules and are normally identified by researchers as the 
reasons that unpublished opinions need not be considered.74  All of the 
judges that I interviewed or surveyed agreed that these factors are the most 
important in making decisions on publication.75 
The first factor—that the case lacks precedential value because many 
prior cases have addressed the issue—was cited as of the highest 
importance by all of the judges.76  Of course, the devil is in the details of 
how each judge decides what may have precedential value and why it has 
value as a precedent.  A judge’s ability to predict precedential value has 
been questioned by many, including by judges themselves.77  Some judges, 
 
 72. See supra Table 1. 
 73. See supra Table 1.  Because of the use of opinions or orders without an identified 
author, the changes in an individual judge’s publication percentages over time would likely 
be impossible to confirm based solely on publicly available information; only actual 
numbers of published authored cases can be determined.  I have not sought to do 
comparisons of actual numbers of published opinions over an extended time period, as this 
would also require consideration of changes in caseloads, periods when a judge may have a 
lessened caseload due to illness, or other circumstances which could affect the judge’s work 
output.  However, an empirical comparison of changes in publication practices based on a 
judge’s experience would be a good area for additional research. 
 74. See supra Table 1. 
 75. See supra Table 1. 
 76. See supra Table 1. 
 77. Most judges seem to accept the factor of precedent potential as entirely proper, and 
it is included in the official rules of many courts (including my own, the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals, under N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e)(1)).  Not all judges agree.  See, e.g., Arnold, 
supra note 6, at 222 (“This practice disturbs me so much that it is hard to know where to 
begin in discussing it.”).  Arnold explains: 
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and certainly some practicing lawyers, believe that even though a legal rule 
may be well established, it is useful to have cases addressing the 
application of that rule to a variety of fact patterns.  Having a published 
case addressing a particular fact pattern may provide more guidance to 
lower courts and to litigants, thus leading to more cases settling before trial 
and fewer appeals.  Other judges believe that once the rule is well 
established, additional fact patterns alone are not a good reason to 
publish.78  Judges also note that it is not uncommon to find unpublished 
cases that address issues of first impression.79  One Fourth Circuit judge 
noted that “hardly a week goes by without finding an unpublished opinion 
that decides a matter of first impression.”80 
A few of the judges in the study identified a slightly different view for 
determining precedential value.  Some favor nonpublication of diversity 
cases because such cases would not have precedential value on issues of 
state law.81  Even if the federal court addresses state law, the opinion would 
not have precedential value in that state, even if the opinion were 
published.82  Others believe that although the opinion is not binding on the 
state courts, the federal court’s analysis of the issue might be persuasive 
 
I question the proposition that any opinion lacks precedential value. . . . To be 
sure, there are many cases that look like previous cases, and that are almost 
identical.  In each instance, however, it is possible to think of conceivable reasons 
why the previous case can be distinguished; and when a court decides that it 
cannot be, it is necessarily holding that the proffered distinctions lack merit under 
the law. 
Id.  Songer agrees that determination of precedential value is a subjective decision: 
The rules governing publication in the circuits are stated in very broad general 
language.  No precise, objective guidelines are included.  Judges are admonished 
to avoid publishing decisions if their opinion would have no precedential value; 
but interpretation of such rules is inevitably quite subjective.  As a result, it should 
not be too surprising that we found that the rules were not applied in a consistent 
manner by different judges.  In effect, this means that there are potentially a 
different set of implicit rules for publication in each circuit and perhaps even for 
each combination of judges that sit together in the same circuit.  Determination of 
what those implicit criteria are is beyond the scope of the present study.  It may be 
that they are largely unarticulated assumptions that shape the perceptions of 
judges about the importance of various cases which are derived from the 
socialization, values and experiences of the various judges. 
Songer, supra note 11, at 313. 
 78. See supra Table 1. 
 79. Anonymous Survey Response (Dec. 8, 2013) (on file with author). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See supra Table 1.  
 82. See Sanders v. Mueller, 133 F. App’x 37, 41 (4th Cir. 2010) (“In a diversity action, 
state law of the forum court governs substantive issues . . . .” (citing Dixon v. Edwards, 290 
F.3d 699, 710 (4th Cir. 2002))).  
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and helpful to trial judges, and thus, they do not consider diversity 
jurisdiction to be a factor in the publication decision.83  A judge who had 
many years of experience as a federal district court judge noted that when 
he was serving as a district court judge, he hesitated to publish a case that 
addressed a novel issue of state law in a diversity case because he did not 
want lawyers to attempt to use his opinion as binding precedent.84  But 
since cases in federal court have the benefit of consideration by a panel of 
three judges, and more thorough research than may be available to a single 
judge at the trial level, the diversity issue no longer influenced his 
consideration of precedential value.85  Although the case would have only 
persuasive value in the state whose law was addressed, it may nonetheless 
be useful to the bench and the bar. 
Jurisprudential factors logically lead to nonpublication of the majority 
of cases in areas of law with heavy caseloads, such as immigration and 
employment cases, as these cases are so common, and because they often 
present similar factual situations with legal issues that have been addressed 
in prior cases.  Yet the influence of unpublished cases may be significant in 
these heavily litigated areas as well, perhaps because there are so many 
unpublished cases in these areas of law that are still readily searchable and 
may be used to guide the drafting of other opinions.86  Judges also 
acknowledge that even cases of a type that frequently appear before the 
court may present important and novel issues, or that the lower courts may 
be even more acutely in need of appellate guidance because of the 
frequency of these types of cases, making them more inclined to publish.87 
The next factor, “efficiency; the need to get cases completed 
promptly,” was not endorsed by judges at all.  This is interesting, since it 
was originally one of the main reasons for nonpublication of cases and, as 
noted above, is implicitly recognized by Federal Circuit IOP 10.88  In any 
individual case, judges claim that they do not consciously consider the 
“efficiency” factor, but the “efficiency” systemic factor is always present, 
because judges have the option to issue unpublished opinions—an option 
that has not always existed.89  Certainly, it would be impossible for the 
 
 83. See supra Table 1. 
 84. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill. 
(Nov. 3, 2013). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Soucek, supra note 17, at 160–64. 
 87. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C. 
(Nov. 26, 2013). 
 88. FED. CIR. I.O.P. 10(1); see text accompanying supra note 20. 
 89. See Arnold, supra note 6, at 219 (noting that the practice of issuing unpublished 
opinions appears to have started in 1964 when the Judicial Conference of the United States 
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federal courts to issue a publication-quality opinion in every case, given the 
caseloads and court resources at this time.  Thus, the efficiency factor is 
built into the court’s processes, and it manifests normally as factor 1 or 2, 
as the judge believes that the question is well settled by existing law and 
there is no need to devote additional time and resources to yet another 
published opinion. 
Another reason that judges may not endorse an unpublished opinion as 
a way to save time and effort is that many judges do not believe that 
unpublished opinions are that much easier or quicker to prepare than a 
published opinion.90  One judge noted, “I try to write them all the same, 
whether published or unpublished.”91  Since all opinions are now available 
and searchable in electronic databases, judges do not want to issue clearly 
inferior work, even if an opinion is “unpublished.”  Even if an unpublished 
opinion or order does not identify an author, judges still take great pride in 
their work, and each judge who is on the panel can be identified, so they 
must devote a certain amount of time and effort to each opinion to make 
sure that it is of sufficient quality.92 
 
“issued a general recommendation that judges publish only those opinions ‘which are of 
general precedential value’” (quoting ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964))). 
 90. W. Warren H. Binford et al., Seeking Best Practices Among Intermediate Courts of 
Appeal: A Nascent Journey, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37, 84–85 (2007).  Research of the 
state appellate courts has also found that judges “have not seen an appreciable decrease in 
the amount of preparation time as a result” of issuing unpublished opinions.  Id. (quoting the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ response to Binford’s survey). 
 91. Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 
7, 2013). 
 92. See Schiltz, supra note 10, at 1486 (citations omitted).  Schiltz writes: 
Judges are also proud people.  They care about their reputations, and they care 
about their legacies.  Those reputations—and those legacies—are almost entirely a 
function of judges’ opinions.  Justice Louis Brandeis, when asked whether he was 
writing his memoirs, reportedly said: “I think you will find that my memoirs have 
already been written.”  He was referring, of course, to his opinions.  The giants of 
the federal appellate bench in the twentieth century—Learned Hand, Henry 
Friendly, Richard Posner—owe their reputations in no small part to the fact that 
they wrote their own opinions.  After Judge Friendly died, the Harvard Law 
Review published a series of tributes in his honor.  The very first sentence of the 
very first tribute was: “Henry Friendly did his own work.”  Few judges can write 
all of their own opinions today, but they still aspire to leave a respected and 
influential body of work.  Judges have a strong sense of ownership in their 
opinions—which itself explains much of the strong feeling about Rule 32.1. 
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman, In Memoriam: Henry J. Friendly, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1986)). 
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b.  Case-Quality Factors 
Case-quality factors are particularly difficult for researchers to discern 
or quantify in a statistical analysis, but they are quite important to judges in 
the publication decision-making process.  The ways to deal with case-
quality issues may also vary by circuit.  The ideal is that a published case 
that addresses an important legal issue should be based upon a full, well-
developed record and all of the angles of the case should have been 
examined and presented to the court by brief and argument.  In a perfect 
world, important legal issues would all be presented in this manner, but our 
world is not perfect.  Records may lack crucial information, and as a 
general rule, there is no way to change the record once the case is on 
appeal.93  The litigants may have failed to preserve issues for appellate 
review, or they may have violated rules of the court in presenting issues. 
In criminal cases, defendants will almost always have court-appointed 
counsel, so both sides will be presented to the court by attorneys.  
Unfortunately, even if all parties are represented by counsel, not all 
attorneys have equal ability, and many have little appellate experience.  
The overall rate of pro se appeals is quite high, and appointment of counsel 
to pro se litigants in civil cases happens rarely.94  In civil cases, litigants 
have no right to court-appointed counsel.  In both the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, the courts may occasionally appoint counsel to represent parties in 
civil pro se cases presenting important issues.  Representation is provided 
pro bono by law firms that have volunteered to perform this service and 
through law-school legal clinics.  But the vast majority of pro se appeals 
remain just that, and almost all judges agree that they are much less likely 
to publish a case that was presented pro se, mainly because of the poor 
presentation of the case or the absence of a valid legal issue.95 
Most judges agree that the quality of the representation by counsel is 
reflected in the quality of the opinion, or as one judge put it, “almost all bad 
judgments are from bad lawyering,” and judges try to avoid publishing bad 
judgments.96  However, most judges also agree that poor briefs are not 
typically a reason to avoid publication; poor briefs just create more work 
for the court, since the judges must make sure that the issues are fully 
 
 93. See FED. R. APP. P. 10(c)–(e). 
 94. LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 38–39 (2d ed. 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ 
lookup/caseman2.pdf/$file/caseman2.pdf. 
 95. See supra Table 1. 
 96. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill. 
(Nov. 3, 2013). 
28
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/4
2015] THE BOTTOM OF THE ICEBERG 361 
researched.97  Because these case-quality factors create more work for the 
judge who must write an opinion in a poorly presented case, the “effort 
averse” judge may decide that it is not worth the effort. 
According to the famously prolific Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. 
Posner,98 effort aversion, which “includes both reluctance to work ‘too’ 
hard . . . and reluctance to quarrel with colleagues,” is an integral part of 
judicial decision-making.99  Unsurprisingly, Judge Posner believes that the 
option to issue opinions as unpublished tends to be overused by federal 
judges, but he acknowledges that case-quality factors properly lead to 
nonpublication of many cases.100 
c. Collegiality Factors 
It is paradoxical that the judges seem to disagree on the importance of 
the collegiality factors more than the other factors.  Former Chief Judge 
Harry T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit has described a collegial court as a court where “judges 
have a common interest, as members of the judiciary, in getting the law 
right, and . . . as a result, [they] are willing to listen, persuade, and be 
persuaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect.”101  A court’s 
 
 97. See, e.g., id. 
 98. In addition to publishing more cases than other judges on the court, Judge Posner 
has authored more than forty books and more articles than I could count.  In fact, he has 
written so much that there is a book devoted to quotes from his court opinions.  See THE 
QUOTABLE JUDGE POSNER: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS 
(Robert F. Blomquist ed., 2010). 
 99. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 7 (“Both [effort aversion and conflict aversion] are 
aspects of the ‘quiet life’ that is especially valued by persons in jobs that offer little upward 
mobility—and in the case of a federal judgeship involve virtually no downward mobility—
and few opportunities for increasing their pecuniary income other than by quitting and, in 
the case of judges, having quit, going into the private practice of law.”). 
 100. See id. at 55.  Judge Posner explains: 
The vast majority of unpublished decisions are affirmances, and . . . this is a 
reflection of the signal lack of merit of most cases filed in the federal district 
courts.  It doesn’t cost much to file a case; the filing fee is low and the plaintiff is 
not required to be represented by a lawyer.  There are also many incompetent 
lawyers, many potential plaintiffs who have very low opportunity costs of suing 
(prison inmates, for example), and many emotional plaintiffs with a deep sense of 
having been wronged who will sue even if there is no substantial legal ground for 
suing.  These cases are losers and the unpublished decisions affirming their 
dismissal have little impact on the law, especially since most such decisions 
cannot be cited as precedents. 
Id. 
 101. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645 (2003) (citing Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-
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collegiality and its productivity are closely related.  Judge Edwards notes 
that work on “the appellate bench is a group process.”102  Court collegiality 
is a part of each courts’ culture, which some researchers have described as 
including “sociability” and “solidarity.”103  “Sociability” is “the degree to 
which judges and administrators get along and emphasize the importance 
of social relations,” and “solidarity” is “the degree to which a court has 
clearly stated and shared goals, mutual interests, and common tasks.”104  
The Judicial Conference of the United States has recognized that 
collegiality is part of the very definition of a “court”: 
An appellate “court,” in this special sense, is not merely an administrative 
entity.  Nor should it consist of a large group of strangers—like a jury 
venire—who are essentially unknown to one another.  Rather, a “court” is a 
cohesive group of individuals who are familiar with one another’s ways of 
thinking, reacting, persuading, and being persuaded.  The court becomes an 
institution—an incorporeal body of precedent and tradition, of shared 
experiences and collegial feelings, whose members possess a common 
devotion to mastering circuit law, maintaining its coherence and 
consistency (thus assuring its predictability), and adjudicating cases in like 
manner.105 
I have identified the factors that I call “collegiality factors” as lack of 
review (even by internal informal means) by entire court so that the opinion 
may not represent the views of the entire court (factor number nine); 
agreement as to outcome but some disagreement among panel judges as to 
rationale of opinion so the use of unpublished opinion avoids the need for 
dissenting or concurring opinions (factor number ten); and the authoring 
judge’s lack of experience or expertise in the legal subject matter (factor 
number eleven). 
These factors are grouped under “collegiality” because they are ways 
in which the judges work together and strive to make a clear and consistent 
presentation of the law from the court.  Since published opinions carry 
 
Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 
1612–13 (1995)).  Further, Judge Edwards describes collegiality as “a process that helps to 
create the conditions for principled agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and 
considered.”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 102. Id. at 1656. 
 103. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Court Culture, in CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: 
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, at 1, 2 (Court Statistics Project, Nat’l Ctr. for 
State Courts, Caseload Highlights Vol. 11, No. 2, May 2005), http://cdm16501. 
contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/ctadmin/id/664. 
 104. Id. 
 105. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
44 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/FederalCourts 
LongRangePlan.pdf. 
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precedential value, these opinions are binding on the court in the future, 
and judges believe it is important both to get the law right and to ensure 
that no other members of the court have serious objections or reservations 
to a particular opinion.106  For both the Fourth and Seventh Circuit courts, 
the final publication decision is almost always made by the authoring 
judge.107  The author has essentially unlimited discretion in this decision.108  
Other judges on the panel or on the court may recommend publication, but 
typically, the other judges defer to the author, and recommendations to 
publish an opinion that was written as an unpublished opinion are 
uncommon.109  Authoring judges consider a recommendation to publish 
very seriously, and often will convert the opinion to a published opinion, 
although it may require more work to perform additional research and add 
more analysis to the draft.110  Law clerks may also recommend for or 
against publication, and judges tend to take these recommendations 
seriously.111  Very seldom, staff counsel, the circuit executive, or a clerk 
may recommend publication, particularly in a case that raises an issue that 
comes up frequently in a certain type of case, and where they believe that 
more guidance to the trial courts would be helpful.112  But ultimately, the 
authoring judge has the final say in the publication decision.113  For this 
reason, looking at the written rules of the court for guidance on the 
publication of judicial decisions tells us very little.  Each judge makes her 
own decisions independently, weighing all of the factors discussed 
independently, and judges tend to view the rules and the reasons for 
publication a bit differently.114 
The tenth factor, the agreement not to publish to avoid dissent, is the 
scenario that attorneys fear the most.  The judges disagree only on the 
analysis or legal reasoning for this outcome, and the compromise will allow 
 
 106. See Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, 
N.C. (Nov. 26, 2013); Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 3, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 7, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Oct. 2, 2013); Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Richmond, Va. (Sept. 17–19, 2013).  
 107. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); see also Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, supra note 106. 
 108. Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, 
supra note 106. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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the court to get the opinion completed more quickly.  But are the judges 
really just seeking a certain result at the expense of the law?  Are they 
engaging in “effort aversion” by avoiding the work of writing a dissent?115  
Nearly all judges agree that they have seen this happen, but this is not a 
“deal” to get a benefit in the future or to get a particular result.116  All of the 
judges in my study who acknowledged that this type of compromise does 
occur also agree that this is done only in cases where the judges agree on 
the result of the case—meaning the outcome for the parties will be the 
same either way.117 
Some empirical research based on published cases has indicated that 
judges do “bargain” to reach compromises in the rationale of published 
opinions.118  It is perhaps no coincidence that the idea of bargaining or 
compromise among panel judges tends to inspire intense disagreement, as 
this sort of behavior strikes at the heart of the divide between philosophical 
theories of adjudication.  The importance of deliberations and collegiality 
 
 115. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 7, 385–86.  The authors write: 
We have found that like other workers judges exhibit in their judicial behavior 
leisure preference and, something that includes but goes beyond leisure 
preference, effort aversion—as when appellate judges yield to the views of 
colleagues rather than insisting on dissenting every time they hold contrary views, 
or dissent less frequently the heavier their caseload grows. 
Id. at 385–86.  For a detailed analysis of the use of dissents in the federal courts of appeals 
and the United States Supreme Court, see id. at 255–304.  Yet, dissent aversion cannot be 
fully explained by “leisure preference.”  See Renée Cohn Jubelirer, The Behavior of Federal 
Judges: The “Careerist” in Robes, 97 JUDICATURE 98, 100 (2013) (“The authors [of The 
Behavior of Federal Judges] do not explain why [leisure preference is] more important than 
other non-monetized factors, such as the intrinsic interest of the work, prestige or pride, a 
sense of accomplishment or value in the work, or the social dimension of the work.”). 
 116. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in 
Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 742 (2008) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Trading 
Votes for Reasoning] (“We are suggesting a form of logrolling—behavior considered 
common in legislatures.  But the view with respect to courts appears to be that judges would 
not engage in such unseemly behavior.” (citing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 156–57 (2007))). 
 117. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, supra note 106. 
 118. Choi & Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning, supra note 116, at 739.  “The 
multimember panel studies indicate that the votes of judges are influenced by the ideologies 
of other judges on the same panel.  Either to maintain collegiality, to avoid a judge’s 
breaking away to author a dissenting opinion, or simply because of group dynamics, judges 
appear to moderate their voting in settings where there is potential diversity in political 
views.”  Id. 
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in judicial decision-making has been debated by the legal realists119 and 
legalists120 for many years. 
Research indicates that these differences between judges are not the 
traditional ideological differences, but they may have significant influence 
on how the judge works with other judges to decide a case.121  For example, 
some judges may be characterized as “outcome judges” who care more 
about the vote in a particular case, while others are “precedent judges” who 
care more about the “legal precedent established through the reasoning” of 
the majority opinion.122  In recent years, some researchers have proposed 
expanding the traditional classifications of judges beyond ideology to 
include many factors, including the interactions of judges on the panel or 
court.123 
 
 119. Richard A. Posner, Realism About Judges, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 577, 578 (2011).  
The traditional conception of legal realism views the judge as merely a discoverer and 
transmitter of the law: 
The modern idea of the judge as analyst shares with the idea of the judge as oracle 
the assumption that legal questions always have right answers: answers that can be 
produced by transmission from an authoritative source, though in the modern view 
the transmission is not direct but is mediated by analysis. 
Id. 
 120. Id. at 580.  Judge Richard Posner, likely one of the most prolific and pertinacious 
current proponents of legal realism, claims that Judge Harry Edwards “is the most 
pertinacious current critic of legal realism as a positive theory of judicial 
behavior . . . . Judge Edwards contends that the realist scholars exaggerate the degree to 
which judges are unable to achieve agreement through deliberations that, overriding 
ideological and other differences, generate an objectively correct decision.”  Id. (first citing 
Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 
1335 (1998); then citing Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the 
“Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 
619 (1985); and then citing Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1908–10). 
 121. See Choi & Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning, supra note 116, at 746 (citations 
omitted). 
 122. See id. at 742, 746; see also Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the 
Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1415–16 (2009) (citing DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 22 & tbl.2.1, 26 (2002)). 
 123. See Corey Rayburn Yung, A Typology of Judging Styles, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1757, 
1757 (2013) [hereinafter Yung, Typology]. 
  For example, Professor Yung proposes nine different “distinctive judicial decision-
making styles” for federal appellate judges: Trailblazing, Consensus Building, Stalwart, 
Regulating, Steadfast, Collegial, Incrementalist, Minimalistic, and Error Correcting.  See id. 
at 1761–62.  An exposition of these types is beyond the scope of this Article, but Yung 
found that these nine decision-making styles did a better job of predicting future votes than 
the traditional ideological model.  See id. at 1803.  Of particular relevance to the 
consideration of collegiality was the finding that 
the two most basic dispositional choices an appellate judge could make, to dissent 
or reverse, were both better explained using the judge style categories. In the case 
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III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT  
COURTS OF APPEALS 
One of the notable differences between the Fourth and Seventh Circuit 
Courts of Appeals is the difference in the judges’ views as to the most 
controversial factor—the compromise to issue an unpublished opinion 
when the panel agrees on the outcome but not the analysis.  On the Seventh 
Circuit, no judge endorsed this factor as having an influence on the 
publication decision.124  On the Fourth Circuit, several judges endorsed 
compromise and gave well-considered reasons for this approach.125  For 
example, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III cited authority for his position, 
noting that the United States Supreme Court has endorsed “flexibility in the 
processes of the Courts of Appeals” in Pearson v. Callahan,126 which he 
identified as “one of the most important cases of the last decade,” and a 
case that is “very insightful about how courts operate.”127  He noted that 
compromise on a narrow or broad ground for a decision is “a mechanism to 
reach consensus.  Compromise is not a bad word for every institution, 
 
of predicting the dissenting judge, the classic ideology-based model showed just 
modest improvements over predictions based upon a random guess with model 
consistency levels of approximately 40 to 46%.  The judicial typology model, in 
contrast, was accurate in approximately 72 to 90% of cases tested (depending 
upon a variation in the model).  The decision to reverse by a panel, and not just an 
individual judge, was also better explained by the judicial typology model. 
Corey Rayburn Yung, How Judges Decide: A Multidimensional Empirical Typology of 
Judicial Styles in the Federal Courts 4 (Feb. 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (Northwestern 
University School of Law & University of Chicago Law School Workshop on Judicial 
Behavior) [hereinafter Yung, How Judges Decide]. 
 124.  Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, 
Ill. (Nov. 3, 2013). 
 125. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C. 
(Nov. 26, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit (Oct. 7, 2013); Telephone Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit (Oct. 2, 2013); Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, in Richmond, Va. (Sept. 17–19, 2013). 
 126. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).  Justice Samuel Alito, himself a 
former judge on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, wrote this unanimous opinion, which 
eliminated the two-step analysis that had previously been required by Saucier v. Katz, 533 
U.S. 194, 199–200 (2001).  Part of the rationale for this change was that the Saucier rule 
“create[d] a risk of bad decisionmaking” when the “briefing of constitutional questions is 
woefully inadequate” in the lower court, and that, in some cases, “a court will rather quickly 
and easily decide that there was no violation of clearly established law [the second prong] 
before turning to the more difficult question whether the relevant facts make out a 
constitutional question at all [first prong].”  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239.  These cases tend to 
be very fact-specific and contribute little to the law, although the two-step analysis created 
more work for the trial court.  See id. 
 127. Telephone Interview with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, supra note 1. 
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whether in Congress or corporate governance or a court.”128  His comments 
are consistent with his reputation as a collegial judge.129 
Other judges view this sort of compromise with suspicion.  Judge 
Richard S. Arnold of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit presented a hypothetical example of “some of the effects” that the 
use of unpublished opinions can have “on the psychology of judging”: 
[I]f, after hearing argument, a judge in conference thinks that a certain 
decision should be reached, but also believes that the decision is hard to 
justify under the law, he or she can achieve the result, assuming agreement 
by the other members of the panel, by deciding the case in an unpublished 
opinion and sweeping the difficulties under the rug.  Again, I’m not saying 
that this has ever occurred in any particular case, but a system that 
encourages this sort of behavior, or is at least open to it, has to be subject to 
question in any world in which judges are human beings.130 
Former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit Patricia Wald also disapproves of this type of 
compromise: 
I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision 
incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming 
public debate about what law controls.  I have even seen wily would-be 
dissenters go along with a result they do not like so long as it is not 
elevated to a precedent.  We do occasionally sweep troublesome issues 
under the rug, though most will not stay put for long.131 
Why is there a difference in the view of the compromise on analysis 
and issuance of an unpublished opinion between these two circuits?  At this 
point, I can say only that it seems to exist and speculate as to why.  The 
Fourth Circuit does have a larger caseload, and due to the court’s policy of 
circulating all published opinions to the entire court, the court has even 
more work to do on the published cases than the Seventh Circuit, which 
does not circulate all published cases to the entire court prior to issuance.132  
 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Yung, How Judges Decide, supra note 123, at 51 (“[T]here are a lot of good fits 
in terms of similarities between impressionistic and quantitative categorization. Judge 
Wilkinson, a judge who has long championed collegiality among judges is designated as a 
Collegial Moderate Republican.” (citing J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth 
in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1170 (1994))). 
 130. Arnold, supra note 6, at 223. 
 131. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995). 
 132. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); 4TH CIR. I.O.P.-36.2; see also U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK FOR APPEALS TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 155 (2014), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ 
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The Fourth Circuit’s workload may lead to more of a need for compromise 
to get the work done in a timely manner and more of a need to focus work 
on the very small percentage of published cases so that they will be of 
sufficient quality to be issued as precedential opinions.  Yet none of the 
Fourth Circuit judges specifically endorse efficiency, or the need to get 
cases done, as a reason for nonpublication; as noted above, this factor is 
built into the court’s rules and operating procedures at two levels—the 
selection of cases for oral argument, and the decision whether to publish 
following oral arguments.133 
The difference in views on the compromise to issue an unpublished 
opinion is not explained by ideology, since this is not a traditional liberal–
conservative ideological issue.134  Given the individual and entirely 
discretionary nature of the publication decision, the decision-making styles 
of the individual judges may be the crucial distinction.  Yung’s 
classifications of the decision-making styles on these two circuits seem to 
fit with the results of my interviews.  Although his data is based only on 
cases from 2008, and not all the same judges are on the two courts now, 
many are the same.  Although he did not consider the judges’ views on 
unpublished opinions specifically, he did consider collegiality, and the 
publication decision is an element of collegiality, although it has been 
expressed in the literature normally as “dissent avoidance” while the 
decision not to publish might be called “precedential opinion avoidance.”  
Yung’s distribution of judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits by 
decision-making style is shown in Table 2 below:135 
 
Table 2: Decision-Making Styles on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
 
Decision-making style Fourth Circuit Seventh Circuit 
Error-correcting 25% 21% 
Regulating 17% 14% 
Collegial 41% 22% 
 
rules/handbook.pdf [hereinafter SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK] (“Copies of a proposed 
opinion or order are circulated to members of the panel . . . .”). 
 133. See infra notes 166–76 and accompanying text. 
 134. In any event, neither circuit seems to have extreme ideological variance among the 
judges, as some other circuits do.  See Yung, Typology, supra note 123, at 43 fig.20.  
Yung’s analysis of data from 2008, which included unpublished opinions, of the average 
ideological variance on all of the federal courts of appeal determined that variance on the 
Fourth Circuit was 10.5, while the Seventh Circuit was 10.3.  The highest average 
ideological variance was on the Sixth Circuit, at 36.1.  See id. at 12, 43 fig.20. 
 135. See Yung, How Judges Decide, supra note 123, app. D at 77, 79. 
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Pragmatic 17% 29% 
Minimalistic -- 14% 
 
The main differences between the two courts fall under collegiality 
and pragmatism.  Again, this is not surprising, with Judge Wilkinson being 
well known for his promotion of collegiality,136 and Judge Posner likely the 
most famous pragmatist among the federal judges.137  In addition, 
collegiality appears to lead to a willingness of panel members to 
compromise, which may lead to issuance of an unpublished opinion with 
what all agree to be the correct result, although all do not agree on the legal 
rationale.  The idea of an agreement to compromise by issuing an 
unpublished opinion reaching the result that the entire panel agrees on, 
even if lacking complete agreement on rationale, is thus acceptable to some 
judges and not acceptable to others.  Most judges acknowledge that this 
happens, although most seem to disavow any personal participation in such 
an agreement. 
Judges on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals were also more likely 
to cite a lack of experience or expertise in an area of law as a potential 
reason not to publish an opinion.138  As one judge noted, a lack of expertise 
in a subject area “could be a factor, in immigration, ERISA, specialized 
areas—it depends on time you have to study the area of law.  If you are 
advancing something neither side advocated, it is probably tricky.  You 
may not know why they did not bring it up.”139  Judges on the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals were less likely to endorse this factor.140  One 
judge jokingly responded, “We’re all experts in everything.”141  He also did 
not endorse lack of expertise as influencing the publication decision.142  
Yet, the expertise factor is likely tempered by the fact that on both courts, 
the chief judge on a panel assigns the cases to members of the panel and 
may consider the interest or expertise of each judge in making these 
assignments.  The fact that the chief judges consider expertise in making 
case assignments indicates that the factor is of some concern to the court.  
 
 136. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Gavin Broady, The Prolific Pragmatist: Judge Richard Posner, LAW360 (Mar. 
25, 2014, 3:02 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/520805/the-prolific-pragmatist-judge- 
richard-posner (discussing Judge Posner’s reputation for pragmatism on the bench). 
 138. See supra Table 1. 
 139. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C. 
(Nov. 26, 2013). 
 140. See supra Table 1. 
 141. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill. 
(Nov. 3, 2013). 
 142. Id.  
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But the cases are still assigned to panels at random on both courts, so even 
if the court has a judge with great expertise in a particular area, that judge 
may not end up on the panel that considers the case.143  And on both courts, 
judges may sometimes consult other judges who are not on the panel.144  In 
any event, the judges tend to draw on the experience and expertise of the 
other members of the court, which is part of the collegiality of the court.145 
The last collegiality factor, lack of review by the entire court, is also 
important to both courts, even if the judges do not specifically endorse it, as 
it is addressed by the rules and procedures of each court.146  In the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, all published opinions are circulated to the entire 
court before opinions are issued.147  This circulation process means that 
each judge must read and consider not only the cases that she has been 
assigned but also cases that other panels have considered if the panel wants 
to publish the opinion.  This circulation procedure increases the judges’ 
workload even more in a court that already has a heavy caseload.  
Additionally, a judge may feel hesitant to publish an opinion, knowing that 
publication will require circulation, adding to the workload of all of the 
judges.  If any judge has serious questions about an opinion, the authoring 
judge will normally address these questions.148  If an opinion is published, 
this usually means that none of the judges have any serious objections to 
the opinion.149  Judges who are not on the panel hearing the case tend to 
defer to the panel, but their views are still considered.150  In addition, if a 
judge has serious questions about a case that has been circulated for 
publication, the judge may call for en banc review of the case, which 
allows all members of the court to participate in the decision.151 
At the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, opinions are not routinely 
circulated to the entire court prior to publication, but all published opinions 
 
 143. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 10; see also 4TH CIR. 
I.O.P.-34.1. 
 144. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, supra note 106. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 160; see also FED. R. APP. P. 
35; supra Table 1. 
 147. See 4TH CIR. R. 36(a); see also 4TH CIR. I.O.P.-36.2. 
 148. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, supra note 106. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id.  But see FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (providing that “[a]n en banc hearing or 
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration 
is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding 
involves a question of exceptional importance”). 
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are circulated to all judges when they are issued.152  The Seventh Circuit 
judges note that a motion for rehearing may be filed and a case may be 
reconsidered.153  In addition, under the Seventh Circuit’s Rule 40(e), a case 
that overrules a prior precedent or conflicts with another circuit is 
circulated prior to issuance and the court may decide to hear the case en 
banc.154  Thus, although the Seventh Circuit judges do not explicitly 
consider whether the entire court would agree with a particular opinion, the 
court does have procedures in place to avoid major disagreements among 
the panels. 
IV. CIRCUIT CHARACTERISTICS 
A. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which sits in Richmond, 
Virginia, hears appeals from the nine federal district courts in Maryland, 
Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, as well as 
from federal administrative agencies.155  Fifteen judges currently serve on 
the Fourth Circuit,156 with one judge who assumed senior status in 1999,157 
and another judge who received senior status in 2014.158 
Although the court has had its full complement of authorized judges 
since December 2010, there were several vacant seats for many years.159  
North Carolina suffered from years of senatorial stalemates in the 
confirmation process, leaving several seats on the Fourth Circuit open for 
 
 152. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 155, 160 (citing 7TH CIR. R. 
40(e) (providing for sua sponte rehearing before decision)). 
 153. Interview with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, supra note 
124. 
 154. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 160. 
 155. See About the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts. 
gov/about-the-court/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).  For a summary of the procedures and 
statistics for all federal courts of appeals as of 2010, see HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 
30–32. 
 156. See Judges of the Court, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4. 
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 157. See Senior Judge Clyde H. Hamilton, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., 
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/senior-judge-clyde-h-hamilton (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 158. See Senior Judge Andre M. Davis, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www. 
ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/senior-judge-andre-m-davis (last visited Apr. 
18, 2015). 
 159. See Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 2163 
(2011) (noting that “[f]or over thirty months, the [Fourth Circuit] functioned without a 
quarter of its judicial complement, and for more than a year absent one-third”). 
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years.160  In fact, the seat vacated by Judge James Dickson Phillips, Jr., who 
assumed senior status on July 31, 1994, languished for sixteen years, until 
Judge James Wynn was commissioned on August 10, 2010, to fill the 
vacant seat.161  Judge Albert Diaz was commissioned on December 22, 
2010, to fill the seat vacated by Judge William Walter Wilkins, who 
assumed senior status on July 1, 2007.162  Judge Allyson Duncan, 
commissioned on August 15, 2003, filled the seat previously held by Judge 
Samuel James Ervin, III, who died in 1999.163  Although the court used 
senior judges and district court judges sitting by designation to attempt to 
fill the void, some observers believe that the protracted vacancies may have 
contributed to the Fourth Circuit’s low publication rate.164  Recent court 
 
 160. See id.  Tobias writes: 
The appointment of federal judges has grown extremely controversial.  
Allegations and countercharges, interparty squabbling and unceasing retribution 
have punctuated the appeals court selection process for the last quarter century.  
These phenomena were ubiquitous during the administration of President George 
W. Bush as well as in nominations and appointments to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, especially regarding judgeships assigned to North 
Carolina.  Over the Bush Administration’s concluding half term, the White House 
proffered six nominees for the appellate court’s five vacant positions; the 110th 
Senate promptly confirmed a single prospect and did not even grant votes to the 
remainder. 
Id. 
 161. See Phillips, James Dickson Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInf 
o?jid=1879&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); Judge James A. 
Wynn, Jr., U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/judges- 
of-the-court/judge-james-a-wynn-jr- (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 162. See Judge Albert Diaz, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4. 
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-albert-diaz (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); 
Wilkins, William Walter, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2586& 
cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 163. See Judge Allyson K. Duncan, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4. 
uscourts.gov/judges/judges-of-the-court/judge-allyson-k-duncan (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); 
Ervin, Samuel James III, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=715& 
cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 164. See Tobias, supra note 159, at 2163.  Tobias notes: 
The openings have undercut the Fourth Circuit’s delivery of justice because the 
court was forced to operate without as many as five of the fifteen court of appeals 
judges whom Congress has authorized.  For over thirty months, the court 
functioned without a quarter of its judicial complement, and for more than a year 
absent one-third.  In fact, the court furnishes published opinions for six percent of 
appeals that it resolves, and the court holds oral arguments in thirteen percent, the 
least among the twelve regional circuits.  From September 1999 until August 
2003, the Fourth Circuit had no active member from North Carolina, and during 
the ensuing seven years merely one active judge represented the state on the court. 
Id. 
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statistics indicate that the Fourth Circuit’s cases are handled mostly by the 
resident active judges; resident senior judges and visiting judges participate 
in fewer cases than in any other federal district.165 
Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, each circuit adopts 
its own local rules regarding how cases will be set for argument and how 
publication decisions will be made.166  In the Fourth Circuit, the publication 
decision is governed by Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36.167  That rule provides 
that “[o]pinions delivered by the Court will be published only if the opinion 
satisfies one or more of the standards for publication.”168  Those standards 
include: 
 
  i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of law 
within this Circuit; or 
 ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or 
iii. It criticizes existing law; or 
iv. It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not 
duplicative; or 
v. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a 
conflict with a decision in another circuit.169 
 
Fourth Circuit Rule 36 further provides that “[t]he Court will publish 
opinions only in cases that have been fully briefed and presented at oral 
argument,” and “[o]pinions in such cases will be published if the author or 
a majority of the joining judges believes the opinion satisfies one or more 
of the standards for publication, and all members of the Court have 
acknowledged in writing their receipt of the proposed opinion.”170  
 
 165. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THE JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, at U.S.C.A. tbl.6 (2012), 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/rpt/2012_report.pdf.  For the twelve-month period ending on 
December 31, 2012, visiting and senior judges participated in about 6.9% of cases in the 
Fourth Circuit.  Id.  In contrast, senior or visiting judges participated in about 23.2% of 
cases at the Seventh Circuit.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit, which has by far the greatest caseload 
of the federal courts, used senior or visiting judges in about 30.6% of its cases in the same 
time period.  Id. 
 166. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of 
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been (i) 
designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the 
like . . . .”); id. R. 34(a)(1) (“Any party may file, or a court may require by local rule, a 
statement explaining why oral argument should, or need not, be permitted.”). 
 167. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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Additionally, “[a] judge may file a published opinion without obtaining all 
acknowledgments only if the opinion has been in circulation for ten days 
and an inquiry to the non-acknowledging judge’s chambers has confirmed 
that the opinion was received.”171  Fourth Circuit Rule 36(b) provides basic 
guidelines for unpublished opinions.172 
Because Fourth Circuit Rule 36(a) provides that all published opinions 
must have been “fully briefed and presented at oral argument,” the decision 
not to permit argument in a case is essentially a preemptive decision that 
the case will be unpublished.173  In rare instances, a judge may have a case 
that was originally scheduled to be considered on the briefs reset for 
argument, but normally, a case that is not argued will not be published.174  
Thus, Federal Rule 34(a) is also important in the publication decision 
process.  Federal Rule 34(a) provides, in part, that “[o]ral argument must be 
allowed in every case unless a panel of three judges who have examined 
the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument is 
unnecessary” because “the appeal is frivolous,” “the dispositive issue or 
issues have been authoritatively decided,” or “the facts and legal arguments 
are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional 
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.”175 
Although Federal Rule 34 may, at first glance, seem to be a rule of 
inclusion—that “oral argument must be allowed in every case” unless 
excluded by the panel—in practice, it is more a rule of exclusion.176  The 
usual practice is that the vast majority of cases are not argued,177 and the 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. R. 36(b).  Fourth Circuit Rule 36(b) provides: 
Unpublished opinions give counsel, the parties, and the lower court or agency a 
statement of the reasons for the decision.  They may not recite all of the facts or 
background of the case and may simply adopt the reasoning of the lower court.  
Published and unpublished opinions are sent only to the trial court or agency in 
which the case originated, to counsel for all parties in the case, and to litigants in 
the case not represented by counsel.  Published and unpublished opinions are also 
posted on the Court’s Web site each day and distributed in electronic form to 
subscribers to the Court’s daily opinion lists.  Published and unpublished opinions 
issued since January 1, 1996 are available free of charge at 
www.ca4.uscourts.gov.  Counsel may move for publication of an unpublished 
opinion, citing reasons.  If such motion is granted, the unpublished opinion will be 
published without change in result. 
Id. 
 173. See id. R. 36(a). 
 174. See id. 
 175. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). 
 176. Id. R. 34(a) (emphasis added). 
 177. See Jay O’Keeffe, Behind the Scenes at the Fourth Circuit: How the Court Decides 
Whether to Award Oral Argument, DE NOVO: VA. APP. L. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2013), 
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cases that are considered only on the briefs will not result in published 
opinions.178  Thus, it does appear that the Fourth Circuit has dealt with 
increasing caseloads and judicial vacancies to some extent by adopting 
procedural changes to accommodate the work.179 
In the Fourth Circuit, the usual practice has been to issue most 
unpublished opinions per curiam so that no authoring judge is identified.180  
Some of the judges who have joined the court in recent years believe that 
the court has begun issuing more unpublished opinions with an identified 
author.181  For example, Judge Wynn previously served on the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals, and although it is unusual for that court to issue 
per curiam opinions, its rules as to nonpublication are similar to those of 
the Fourth Circuit.182  In my discussions with many judges, it seems that 
their legal backgrounds, and particularly, their prior judicial experiences, 
inform their approaches on whether a decision to issue an opinion as 
unpublished or per curiam (or both).183 
 
http://www.virginiaappellatelaw.com/2013/09/articles/oral-argument/behind-the-scenes-at-
the-fourth-circuit-how-the-court-decides-whether-to-award-oral-argument/ (“The Fourth 
Circuit hears oral argument in about 9% of the roughly 5,000 cases it considers each year.”); 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG, http://www. 
ncapb.com/courts/united-states-court-of-appeals-for-the-fourth-circuit/ (last visited Apr. 30, 
2015) (noting that “most appeals in the Fourth Circuit are decided on the briefing alone 
without oral argument”). 
 178. See supra notes 170–73 and accompanying text. 
 179. See David R. Stras & Shaun M. Pettigrew, The Rising Caseload in the Fourth 
Circuit: A Statistical and Institutional Analysis, 61 S.C. L. REV. 421, 432 (2010) (providing 
a detailed analysis of the caseloads of the Fourth Circuit from 1979 to 2008 and the 
procedural and systemic changes to address the increasing caseloads, including reduction of 
oral arguments, use of law clerks and staff counsel, and use of unpublished opinions). 
 180. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, supra 
note 125. 
 181. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Raleigh, N.C. 
(Nov. 26, 2013); Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in 
Richmond, Va. (Sept. 17, 2013). 
 182. Compare N.C. R. APP. P. 30(e) (providing that the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
may designate an opinion as unpublished if it “involves no new legal principles 
and . . . would have no value as a precedent”), with 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)–(b) (providing that an 
opinion may be published only if it “establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule 
of law” within the Fourth Circuit, “involves a legal issue of continuing public interest,” 
“criticizes existing law,” “contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative,” 
“resolves a conflict between panels” of the circuit, or “creates a conflict with a decision in 
another circuit”). 
 183. The number of unpublished per curiam opinions issued by the federal courts is 
significant.  See Hannon, supra note 14, at 238–39 (concluding that “close to two-thirds of 
the per curiam opinions issued by the federal circuit courts of appeals after 1970 have been 
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The Fourth Circuit judges are assisted by their law clerks and the staff 
attorney’s office.184  Each judge has four staff members, including either 
four clerks, or three clerks and one judicial assistant.185  The staff attorney’s 
office currently has approximately forty attorneys who assist in preparing 
cases for the panels of judges and draft opinions in cases that are not 
designated for oral argument.186  The number of attorneys in the staff 
attorney’s office has recently declined due to budget cuts, as those who 
leave are not replaced.187  The judges’ chambers have been forced to take 
on some of the duties of preparing drafts of opinions in cases that are not 
orally argued because of the cuts in staff counsel.188  The Office of the 
Clerk of Court “provides case management and automation support for the 
court,” including matters such as calendaring, appointment of counsel, and 
maintaining records.189 
B. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sits in Chicago, Illinois, and 
hears appeals from the seven federal district courts in Illinois, Indiana, and 
Wisconsin.190  The court currently has fourteen active judges, including 
 
unpublished opinions,” and that “the vast majority of these unpublished per curiam opinions 
were issued from 1985 to the present”). 
 184. See Offices, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR., http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/about 
-the-court/offices (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); see also FED. R. APP. P. 45. 
 185. See Who Does What, Chambers Staff: Qs & As, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ 
federal/courts.nsf/autoframe!openform&nav=menu1&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/352 
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015).  The clerks who serve in a judge’s chambers are often called 
“elbow clerks,” referring to the closeness of the relationship between the judge and his or 
her clerks.  Id.  The clerk is “figuratively and sometimes literally, ‘at the judge’s elbow,’ 
unlike other clerks and lawyers who work for the court in other capacities such as staff 
attorneys.”  Id.; see also Elbow Clerk, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
an “elbow clerk” as “[a]n individual judge’s personal clerk”—usually “one who works 
closely with the judge”). 
 186. Beth Scherer, What Is the Fourth Circuit’s Office of Staff Counsel and What Do 
They Do?, N.C. APP. PRAC. BLOG (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.ncapb.com/2014/03/25/what- 
is-the-fourth-circuits-office-of-staff-counsel-and-what-do-they-do/. 
 187. For example, a job posting for a judicial clerkship on the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Richmond, Virginia, notes throughout the posting that budgetary constraints may 
influence the number of individuals hired for the positions.  See Federal Clerkship 
Opportunity, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FOURTH CIR. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ca4.uscourts. 
gov/docs/pdfs/staffattorneyvacancyoct2014.pdf?sfvrsn=4. 
 188. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, supra 
note 125.  
 189. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 99. 
 190. See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SEVENTH CIR., 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/faqs.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2015); Geographic Boundaries 
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five sitting senior judges.191 
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit also has a local rule that 
governs the publication of opinions.192  Under Seventh Circuit Rule 32.1, 
the court states a straight-forward policy: “to avoid issuing unnecessary 
opinions.”193  The rule further provides that “[t]he court may dispose of an 
appeal by opinion or order,” and opinions (including per curiam opinions) 
“are released in printed form, are published in the Federal Reporter, and 
constitute the law of the circuit.”194  Unpublished orders, on the other hand, 
“are unsigned, are released in photocopied form, are not published in the 
Federal Reporter, and are not treated as precedents.”195  The rule allows 
parties to request by motion “that an order be reissued as an opinion,” 
provided that the motion “state[s] why this change would be 
appropriate.”196 
The Seventh Circuit’s rule, unlike the Fourth Circuit’s rule, gives 
almost no guidance on what the court considers in making the publication 
decision. The Seventh Circuit’s rule simply states the policy to avoid 
“issuing unnecessary opinions.”197  In addition, Seventh Circuit Rule 32.1 
sets forth a more detailed description of the types of dispositions that the 
court may issue (either an “opinion” or “order”).198 
This distinction may come as a surprise to some attorneys who think 
of opinions as either “published” opinions that have precedential value, or 
“unpublished” opinions that have no precedential value.  But as Rule 32.1 
 
of United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S. CTS.,  
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 191. See United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, http:// 
ballotpedia.org/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Seventh_Circuit (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2015); Contact Information, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SEVENTH CIR., http:// 
www.ca7.uscourts.gov/contact.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).   
  The vacant seat was created when Judge Terence T. Evans took senior status in 
January 2010 (he died in 2011 and his seat has not yet been filled); additionally, Judge John 
Daniel Tinder plans to retire in 2015.  See Amy Rabideau Silvers, Evans, 71, Served on 
Federal Appeals Court, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Aug. 11, 2011),  
http://www.jsonline.com/news/obituaries/127523413.html; Gabriella Khorasanee, Judge 
John Daniel Tinder Is Retiring, Rejection Letter Reveals, FINDLAW: SEVENTH CIR. NEWS & 
INFO. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2014, 1:22 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/seventh_circuit/2014/03/ 
judge-john-daniel-tinder-is-retiring-rejection-letter-reveals.html. 
 192. 7TH CIR. R. 32.1. 
 193. Id. R. 32.1(a). 
 194. Id. R. 32.1(b). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. R. 32.1(c). 
 197. Id. R. 32.1(a). 
 198. Id. R. 32.1(b). 
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states, there are actually more nuanced designations for cases.  If a 
researcher wants to know both the precedential value of the opinion and the 
identity of the judge who issued the ruling, this information may not be 
readily available, depending on the opinion’s designation. 
There are at least three types of dispositions that an appellate court 
may issue in addition to a simple ruling on a dispositive motion.199  At the 
highest or most transparent level is the traditional published opinion, which 
is signed by one of the judges on the panel as author.200  Slightly below this 
in transparency but equal in precedential value is the per curiam published 
opinion, which identifies the panel, but not an authoring judge (although 
one of the judges was actually assigned as the author, even if a draft was 
prepared by staff counsel).201  For purposes of research on the courts or 
coding a case for a database, it would be impossible to identify an author 
for these opinions.202  Sometimes these opinions are issued in cases that 
may present a security risk to the court, and although the panel must be 
identified, no single judge can be blamed for the ruling.203  Both the Fourth 
and Seventh Circuits issue per curiam published opinions and signed 
unpublished opinions, but there are differences in the courts’ practices.  At 
the Seventh Circuit, the court refers to unpublished written dispositions 
with no identified author from cases that were not orally argued as 
“unpublished orders.”  These unpublished orders typically include a 
reasoned explanation of the court’s ruling and may be pages, not just 
sentences, long; but the tradition at the Seventh Circuit is to call these 
“unpublished orders” and they are labeled as “orders.”204  These are 
 
 199. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 30 (“Judges have three basic options regarding 
how a decision of the court is provided to the public: (1) a signed published opinion; (2) a 
per curiam opinion; or (3) an unpublished nonprecedential opinion or order.”). 
 200. See 7TH CIR. R. 32.1. 
 201. See id.; see also Per Curiam, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
wex/per_curiam (last visited Apr. 30, 2015) (defining a per curiam opinion as one “from an 
appellate court that does not identify any specific judge who may have written the 
opinion”). 
 202. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and 
Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1111–17, 1079 (2005) (citations omitted) 
(discussing that some researchers have attempted to identify authoring judges, and in 
particular, which judges actually write their own opinions, based upon linguistic analysis, 
citation patterns, language patterns, and other features of written opinions). 
 203. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, supra note 106. 
 204. Searching on WestlawNext for “per curiam” opinions issued by the Seventh Circuit 
that were “not selected for publication” in 2014 returns zero cases.  The same search for 
“per curiam” cases that were “not selected for publication” in 2014 on the Fourth Circuit 
returns four cases.  Yet, a search of Seventh Circuit cases for the same time period that were 
“not selected for publication” but were not designated as “per curiam” returns 397 cases, 
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distinguished from “opinions” as well as shorter, procedural orders entered 
either by the clerk, or by a single judge or a panel, dealing with various 
motions in the case.205  “Unpublished orders” normally do not identify one 
of the panel judges as author, but the court does not refer to them as per 
curiam opinions or unpublished opinions, although they would seem to be 
de facto per curiam opinions.206 
At the Seventh Circuit, unlike the Fourth Circuit, the default position 
for any case in which the parties are represented by counsel is that the case 
will be orally argued.207  Even some pro se cases are orally argued, 
although the time they receive will normally be limited.208  As at the Fourth 
Circuit, if a civil pro se case presents important issues, the court may on 
occasion appoint counsel to represent a party or parties for the appeal.209 
Not all cases that are argued receive the same amount of time.  The 
Seventh Circuit has “short argument” days in which each side is allotted 
 
with the panel identified, but not the author.  This search of Fourth Circuit cases in 2014 
returns only forty cases.     
 205. See 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b). 
 206. The designation of “order” versus “opinion” may also alter the cost of public access 
to the document in the PACER system.  PACER’s Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, 
issued April 1, 2013, provides free access for certain documents and to certain parties.  See 
Electronic Public Fee Access Schedule (Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.pacer.gov/documents/ 
epa_feesched.pdf.  Section (8), Automatic Fee Exemptions, provides that “[n]o fee is 
charged for access to judicial opinions.”  Id.  As a general rule, nonparties to a case are 
charged ten cents per page for documents in PACER.  Id.  The document’s designation as an 
“order” or “opinion” is made by the issuing court.  The issue of cost of public access to 
federal court case files is another area of dispute.  Steve Schultze, a program officer for 
Internet Freedom at the United States Department of State, describes the problem as 
follows: 
At some point, PACER added the option for judges to specify that a particular 
document was an “opinion.”  When users download these documents, they are not 
charged.  But what is an opinion?  There have been years of hand-wringing over 
this question.  Courts have been wildly inconsistent in their rate of accurately 
flagging opinions.  The Administrative Office commissioned an expensive study.  
This is all ridiculous, because the law makes no distinction between fees for 
opinions versus other records.  What’s more, in order to find the opinions in the 
first place, the average user has to search for them (and pay) and view the docket 
(and pay). 
Steve Schultze, Making Excuses for Fees on Electronic Public Records, FREEDOM TO 
TINKER (Feb. 7, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/sjs/making-excuses-for-fees-on- 
electronic-public-records/. 
 207. Compare 7TH CIR. R. 34(a)(2), with 4TH CIR. R. 36(a). 
 208. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT HANDBOOK, supra note 132, at 147–48. 
 209. Compare id. at 88, with FED. R. APP. P. 34(b). 
47
Stroud: The Bottom of the Iceberg: Unpublished Opinions
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
380 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:333 
ten minutes for argument.210  The Office of the Circuit Executive reviews 
each case and recommends argument times, and the assigned judges make 
the final determination as to the time allotted for argument of each case.211  
This flexibility in setting argument times allows the court to hear 
arguments in more cases that would likely not be allowed oral argument at 
most federal appellate courts and gives more time to the more complex 
cases which merit receiving the full hour.  This procedure is based upon 
Seventh Circuit Rule 34(b)(1), which gives priority to certain types of 
cases.212  There is no official link between oral argument and publication of 
the opinion at the Seventh Circuit, although certainly a case that is 
published is more likely to have been orally argued. 
The Seventh Circuit judges are assisted by their clerks and the staff 
attorney’s office.  Each associate judge has five staff chambers members, 
either four elbow clerks and a judicial assistant or five elbow clerks;213 the 
chief judge has six chambers staff members.214  The staff attorney’s office 
currently has twenty-five attorneys who assist in preparing cases for the 
panels of judges and draft opinions in cases that are not designated for oral 
argument.215  Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit Office of the 
Clerk of Court “provides case management and automation support for the 
court,” including matters such as calendaring, appointment of counsel, and 
maintaining records.216  In addition, the circuit executive takes an active 
role in screening cases and recommending oral argument times.217  Collins 
Fitzpatrick, the circuit executive, has served the federal courts in the 
Seventh Circuit since 1971, first as a law clerk, and then as a senior staff 
attorney.218  In 1976, he became the first—and so far the only—circuit 
 
 210. See Collins T. Fitzpatrick, Changes to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit Over a Third of a Century, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 535–36 (2008). 
 211. See 7TH CIR. R. 34(b)(1).  Thus, a typical argument day at the Seventh Circuit may 
include some cases that are allowed fifteen or twenty minutes per side, as well as cases that 
receive the traditional thirty minutes per side. 
 212. Id. 
 213. See supra note 185.   
 214. See Chambers Staff: Qs & As, supra note 185. 
 215. See HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 135, 137; see also Who Does What: Court 
Legal Staff, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm& 
nav=menu5b&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/355 (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 216. HOOPER ET AL., supra note 94, at 99. 
 217. See id. at 137, 140. 
 218. See About the Authors: Attorney’s Guide to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 
ST. B. WIS., http://marketplace.wisbar.org/Pages/AK0224_Authors.aspx (last visited Apr. 
29, 2015). 
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executive for the Seventh Circuit.219 
In my interviews at the Seventh Circuit, judges and staff alike echoed 
the sentiments of Don Wall, counsel to the circuit executive, who 
explained, “our culture here is that we give reasoned decisions for every 
case that is fully briefed.”220  He noted that some courts may dispose of 
cases in a one-line order, leaving litigants to wonder why the court made its 
decision, but the Seventh Circuit gives a reasoned decision in each case.221  
Circuit Executive Collins Fitzpatrick made almost exactly the same 
observation in his 2008 law-review article: “The court prides itself in 
writing reasoned decisions in all cases and arguing all the cases that can be 
argued.  The Seventh Circuit is an exception among the courts of appeals 
on both issues.”222 
C. Caseload Comparisons of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
It is not possible to fully understand the work of the federal courts 
without considering the caseloads for each court and the types of cases that 
each court handles.  The caseloads of the federal circuits vary greatly.  For 
example, at the high and low ends of the circuits is the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, where 12,696 cases were filed from March 2013 to March 
2014, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, where 
only 941 cases were filed during the same time period.223   
Table 3 below provides an overview of the various ways in which the 
 
 219. For an excellent overview of the changes in the court and its procedures from 1971 
to 2007, including the effects of changes in technology, see Fitzpatrick, supra note 210. 
 220. Interview with Don Wall, Counsel to the Circuit Executive for the Seventh Circuit, 
in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 3, 2013). 
 221. See id. 
 222. Fitzpatrick, supra note 210, at 540 (citations omitted).  Fitzpatrick’s article also 
provides the percentages of unpublished cases for each federal circuit for the twelve-month 
period ending on September 30, 2007.  See id. at 543.  At that time, the Fourth Circuit heard 
arguments in 8% of cases filed, while the Seventh Circuit heard arguments in 25% of cases 
filed.  See id.  Ninety-three percent of the Fourth Circuit’s cases were unpublished, while 
55% of the Seventh Circuit’s cases were unpublished.  Id.  During that time, the Seventh 
Circuit had the highest publication rate of the twelve federal circuit courts of appeals and the 
Fourth Circuit had the lowest.  Id.  The Fourth Circuit also had the lowest rate of oral 
argument of the federal courts of appeals, while the Seventh Circuit had the highest rate of 
cases argued.  See id.  The First Circuit, which, by far, had the smallest caseload of the 
federal courts of appeals, heard argument in about 30% of cases filed.  See id. 
 223. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.B (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b/ 
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2014/03/31. 
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Fourth and Seventh Circuits terminated cases on the merits in 2014.224 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Cases Filed and Methods of Disposition for the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in  
2013–2014225 
 
Method of Disposition Fourth 
Circuit 
Seventh 
Circuit 
Cases filed 5,061 2,949 
Pro se filings 3,059 1,664 
Cases terminated after oral argument 432 644 
Appeals terminated on the merits 4,023 1,868 
Written opinion/order: signed, published 217 609 
Written opinion/order: signed, unpublished 473 2 
Written opinion/order: reasoned, unsigned, 
published 
7 26 
Written opinion/order: reasoned, unsigned, 
unpublished 
2,906 1,089 
V. ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN RESPONSES OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT JUDGES 
The Fourth and Seventh Circuit judges’ responses as to jurisprudential 
factors were nearly the same.226  This is not surprising, as the first two 
factors are the most frequently cited as the primary reason for 
nonpublication.227  Most judges view cases that may be considered as 
controversial or politically sensitive based upon their facts no differently 
 
 224. Because of the differences in designation of cases filed as “opinions” or “orders,” as 
discussed above, this Table identifies the cases by the actual document filed and not by its 
title.  Thus, an unpublished “order” as used at the Seventh Circuit or an unpublished per 
curiam “opinion” would both be described in Table 3 as a “written, reasoned, and unsigned” 
disposition.  
 225. The information in Table 3 is published by the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS tbl.B-12 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-12/judicial-business/ 
2014/09/30; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY tbl.B-1 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/ 
table/b-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2014/06/30.  
 226. For a summary of responses as to all of the publication decision factors from the 
interviews of judges at both courts, see supra Table 1. 
 227. See supra Table 1. 
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than those with less interesting facts.  The only tendency that judges 
endorse as to these cases is a bit more of an inclination to publish due to the 
need for transparency and not wanting to be seen as trying to hide 
something—something that is not hidden either way, since all of the 
opinions are available.  Indeed, some judges say that they are more likely to 
publish in controversial cases.228  But a published case is not only available 
for all to read; it also has authority as precedent, so by publication, the 
judge is demonstrating that he or she is willing to take a precedential 
position on the controversial issue.  But a case with controversial facts or 
issues will still not be published if the principles of law involved are well 
established, for the same reasons as any other.  In addition, some cases will 
be unpublished due to case-quality factors, discussed below, or collegiality 
factors. 
Most judges on the Fourth and Seventh Circuits also consider case-
quality factors in making a decision to publish.229  In some instances, the 
court cannot address potentially important issues raised by a case due to 
failure to preserve error in the court below, rule violations, or other legal 
missteps.  But even if the case is properly before the court with its issues 
intact and presented to a minimum level of legal effectiveness, a judge who 
believes that the case has not been well argued, researched, or supported by 
a complete record may still have hesitation about publication.  As Judge 
Wilkinson puts it, “you need to know what you don’t know.  When I am on 
the bench, I am aware of the great unknowns.”230  No judge wants to 
publish a precedential case that will run afoul of established but overlooked 
law, or which will disrupt the practices and expectations of the legal 
community or public in a way that the Court failed to appreciate due to the 
poor presentation of the case. 
The most significant differences in the judges’ responses came from 
the factors in the last category: collegiality.231  These factors attempt to 
capture a bit of the courts’ cultures, and how the cultures of the two courts 
differ.  Part of this difference has undoubtedly developed due to the 
disparity in caseloads and court staff.  Judges and staff on both courts 
readily note this difference.  One Seventh Circuit judge noted that the 
ability to hear more cases and publish more opinions is “a luxury that we 
have here” because the court has a lighter caseload than many federal 
 
 228. See Interviews with Judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, supra note 106. 
 229. See supra Table 1. 
 230. Telephone Interview with Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, supra note 1. 
 231. See supra Table 1. 
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appellate courts.232  The Fourth Circuit simply has a heavier caseload, but 
almost the same number of judges, and despite the claims of members of 
the court that going for many years without a full complement of judges did 
not influence their work, it is difficult to believe that the long-term open 
seats had no effect on the way that the court handles its cases.233  Like the 
Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has gotten its work done, but its 
procedures are different.234  The Fourth Circuit’s procedures have enabled 
it to deal with its heavy caseload and to fulfill its constitutional duties, but 
these procedures allow for fewer oral arguments and result in fewer 
published cases.235 
Customs and traditions are pervasive in all courts, not just the federal 
appellate courts.  Some customs are obvious, such as the procedures the 
courts follow during oral arguments.  Judges normally sit in a particular 
order based upon seniority.  In the Fourth Circuit, the judges come down 
from the bench after each argument to greet the attorneys in each case.  
Many of these customs and traditions address how the court performs its 
work and how the judges work together.  Although these types of traditions 
exist in all workplaces, they may be even more important in a court.  Each 
judge is literally her own boss.  Each judge operates her chambers as she 
sees fit.  Federal judges do not face the risk of demotion or termination.  
Although courts have chief judges who handle the administrative and 
organizational needs of the court and supervise court staff, the chief judge 
is not a supervisor of the judges in the usual sense.  So the customs and 
traditions of a particular court—the court culture—are essential for the 
collegiality and efficient functioning of the court.  Some of the court’s 
traditions or customs are embodied in its local rules or written internal 
procedures, but many are unwritten—they are passed on in an informal 
way from the older judges to the newer judges, and they are supported and 
maintained by the staff of the court.  Some customs are merely ceremonial, 
but other customs actually dictate how the judges do their work—how 
cases are assigned, how cases are circulated from one judge to another, and 
how judges communicate with one another about a case that is being 
written. 
Court culture and customs are reflected in the official written rules 
and procedures, but the written rules do not capture the entire process.  
Court culture plays a large role in how the judges perceive and practice the 
 
 232. Interview with Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago, Ill. 
(Nov. 3, 2013). 
 233. See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text; see also supra Table 3. 
 234. See supra notes 166–210 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 166–78 and accompanying text. 
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factors that influence publication decisions.  Each court has its own culture 
surrounding the decisions regarding publication, and each judge has his or 
her own understanding of that culture.236  Some of these customs and 
practices undoubtedly develop from the necessity of dealing with the 
caseloads, but they also develop based upon the history and personalities of 
each court.  They develop based upon the particular caseloads of each 
court, which differ based on the geographical location of the district courts 
from which it receives appeals, as the court creates procedures to deal with 
heavy caseloads in particular areas.  They differ based upon the prior 
judicial experiences brought to the court by new judges, and they may 
change over time as caseloads and personnel change. 
CONCLUSION 
Differences in workloads, combined with the decision-making styles 
of the judges and the court culture, lead to the disparity in publication rates 
between the Fourth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals.  The workload 
contributes to the creation of the courts’ culture, and then the courts’ 
culture reinforces the organizational methods of dealing with the workload.  
Judges on federal courts typically have long tenures, and they tend to work 
together for many years in close-knit communities of judges, clerks, and 
staff.  Although both courts do the same thing—hear appeals and write 
opinions—each has developed its own methods of doing so.  Seemingly 
mundane procedural details, and not necessarily the legal merits of the 
case, influence whether a case will or will not end up as a published 
opinion. 
The fact that an opinion is unpublished does not mean that it is 
unimportant237 to the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction,238 or to research on 
 
 236. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4, at 1915–17 (citations omitted).  Judge Harry 
Edwards notes that the attitudinal model, which characterizes judges as ideologically “left” 
or “right,” fails “to comprehend the importance of assessing judges’ work in the context of 
the judiciary’s institutional norms.”  Id. at 1916–17 (citing Howard Gillman & Cornell W. 
Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes, Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-
Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING 1, 4–5 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman eds., 1999)).  “There is a process of socialization and acculturation during which 
new judges join the judiciary’s culture in which respect for law is accorded a high value.”  
Id. at 1917.  Or, as Songer notes, decisions regarding publication may be based upon 
“largely unarticulated assumptions that shape the perceptions of judges about the 
importance of various cases which are derived from the socialization, values and 
experiences of the various judges.”  Songer, supra note 11, at 313. 
 237. Judges recognize that each case is vitally important to the parties and counsel in that 
case, but that not all cases are important to the jurisprudence of the circuit. 
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the behavior of the courts and judges themselves.  That may have been true 
when courts first began issuing unpublished opinions, but as caseloads have 
increased, the practical bar for publication has moved up higher and higher.  
The substantive content of the caseloads of the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits, even if different in numbers, is not so dissimilar that one could 
conclude that the Fourth Circuit simply gets a much higher number of 
frivolous appeals, pro se cases, Anders brief cases, or other cases that 
would not typically be considered as meriting publication.  There is no 
reason to believe that the quality of the attorneys appearing before the 
Fourth Circuit is inferior to those before the Seventh Circuit or that the 
Fourth Circuit cases would present such a dearth of important legal issues 
that the difference in publication rates could be explained simply by the 
quality and types of cases coming before the court. 
The importance of the internal court culture in the work of a court 
cannot be overstated, but it has been almost entirely ignored in most of the 
empirical research on the federal appellate courts.  This omission is not 
surprising, as court culture is difficult to study or quantify.  Some of these 
difficulties with empirical research on the federal courts have been 
examined by Judge Harry T. Edwards.239  Because researchers focus on a 
few of the more readily quantifiable features of judges, such as political 
party of the appointing president, Judge Edwards notes that this research 
leaves out such essential factors in decision-making that the results of the 
research are subject to serious question.240  He notes that panel deliberation 
is extremely important,241 but that this feature is not only nonquantifiable, it 
is unavailable since it is confidential.242  Given the importance of the many 
factors that may be involved in the publication decision, one judge noted 
that research based only on the published cases “is easy research, reporting 
 
 238. Why some cases are unpublished is simply a mystery, and Justices on the United 
States Supreme Court have, on rare occasions, commented on this.  See supra note 14.   
 239. See Edwards, supra note 101, at 1640; Edwards & Livermore, supra note 4. 
 240. Edwards, supra note 101, at 1640–41 (citations omitted). 
 241. See id. at 1641–43.  But see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 61 (citing Edwards & 
Livermore, supra note 4, at 1949).  But Judge Posner believes that judicial deliberation is 
“overrated.”  Id. at 308.  He describes deliberations as having a “curiously stilted character,” 
since this occurs only after oral arguments and in a format that 
reflects the potential awkwardness of a freewheeling discussion among person 
who are not entirely comfortable arguing with each other because they were not 
picked to form an effective committee, and who as an aspect of the diversity that 
results from the considerations that shape judicial appointments may have 
sensitivities that inhibit discussion of issues involving race, sex, religion, criminal 
rights, immigrants’ rights, and other areas of law that arouse strong emotions. 
Id. at 62. 
 242. Edwards, supra note 101, at 1641–43. 
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on what something looks like, not what it is.  If the premise is wrong, the 
conclusion will be wrong.”243 
Although the personalities of the judges and the panel deliberations 
may defy empirical study, a court’s procedures and organization influence 
its publication rates, and these things can—and should—be studied.  
Researchers and courts should consider how procedural and organizational 
changes may have unintended consequences for the jurisprudence. 
For example, Judge Wynn described how some changes in the 
procedures of the North Carolina Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of 
North Carolina changed the way cases were assigned for oral argument, 
which ultimately led to a transition in the way that life-imprisonment cases 
are considered.244  Prior to December 1995, cases in which a defendant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment were appealed directly to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court and all were orally argued, but the 1995 
amendment to section 7A-27(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes 
provided that only capital cases in which the death penalty was actually 
imposed would be appealed directly to the supreme court, thus decreasing 
the caseload of the supreme court and increasing that of the court of 
appeals.245  At first, the court of appeals continued to hold oral arguments 
for all life-imprisonment cases, just as the supreme court had done.  But 
over time, the court of appeals stopped hearing oral arguments on all life-
imprisonment cases, and sometimes these cases are now even considered as 
“fast track” cases.  Judge Wynn noted that “the bar seems to be unfazed by 
this.”246  But this was a fundamental change in the way that the court has 
dealt with cases of life imprisonment, driven by a combination of 
increasing caseloads and changes in the court’s internal procedures, and not 
by the legal merits of the cases themselves.247  Life in prison is still life in 
prison, and the substance of the law is unchanged; but the court changed its 
procedures, and now these cases are more likely to be unpublished. 
Changes to court procedures to address workload may lead to 
unintended consequences in the development of the law.  One of the 
primary procedural differences between the Fourth and Seventh Circuits is 
the point at which the decision as to publication is made and the ways that 
the cases go through the triage process.248  There is also a difference in the 
point at which the decision regarding publication is made; the decision is 
 
 243. Interview with Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., supra note 63. 
 244. Id. 
 245. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a) (2013). 
 246. Interview with Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., supra note 63. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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normally made at the Fourth Circuit when cases are designated for oral 
argument.249  It seems that when there is more direct judicial involvement 
in the case-triage process, more cases may end up being argued and issued 
as published opinions.  Moreover, the later in the process that the 
publication decision is made, the more likely that an opinion may be 
published, as the judges may realize while researching and drafting the 
opinion that a case presents questions worthy of publication that may have 
been initially overlooked.  Courts should consider the potential effects of 
their procedures on the level of scrutiny given to cases and how procedures 
may favor or disfavor publication. 
These differences in case processing are reflected in each circuit’s 
official rules and internal operating procedures regarding oral argument and 
publication, but there are also subjective factors influencing the triage and 
publication decisions.  In my interviews and surveys, I found that the 
general understanding and customs of court members as to the publication 
decision, part of the court culture, are also quite different.  But with both 
courts, the factors that determine the publication decision clearly 
encompass more than the official publication rules.  Because of the many 
factors that judges consider, and the varying weight each judge may give to 
a particular factor, publication rates even between judges on the same court 
tend to vary.250 
Because of the information that can be hidden in the publication 
decisions and depending upon the issue that the researcher is considering, 
researchers should consider including unpublished cases, to the extent 
possible.  Whether unpublished cases need to be considered will depend on 
the particular issue being researched, as well as the circuit or judges being 
studied.  A database that includes only the published opinions for 2012 
from the Seventh Circuit still includes 41.5% of its cases, a substantial and 
perhaps representative sample, while including only published opinions 
from the Fourth Circuit would be 10.8% of its cases, which is not likely a 
representative sample.  It may be that databases of cases that focus on 
 
 249. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 250. See Choi & Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice, supra note 25, at 42.  
As Choi and Gulati note:  
There are significant differences in the caseloads across the circuits, but the one 
commonality is that the burdens are overwhelming.  They are so overwhelming 
that almost no judge can hope to provide a publication-worthy statement of 
reasons in every case that comes before the judge.  Some judges, however, 
provide published statements of reasons in more cases than others. 
See id. (citation omitted). 
56
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol37/iss2/4
2015] THE BOTTOM OF THE ICEBERG 389 
ideologically charged cases, such as the Sunstein database,251 are even 
more likely to be influenced by other factors that should be considered in 
the research.  Some judges may tend to avoid publication based on a belief 
that if the law is well established, there is no need to stir the pot by 
publishing an opinion about a controversial issue,252 while others tend to 
publish these cases simply because they are controversial.253 
The reasons that judges decide to publish an opinion may contain 
essential information about the way the court works and how the judges 
decide cases.  For this reason, any study of judicial behavior that relies only 
upon published opinions should be scrutinized carefully.  Depending on the 
particular issue being studied, the exclusion of unpublished opinions may 
lead to erroneous conclusions, and the potential importance of the 
unpublished cases may vary based on the particular court issuing the 
opinion, and even based on the judge.  Published opinions are the tip of the 
iceberg, but unpublished opinions are the bottom.  Sailors ignore the 
bottom of the iceberg to their peril.  Judges and researchers may wish that 
they could ignore unpublished opinions, since there are so many, but 
unpublished opinions comprise the majority of the work of the federal 
appellate courts and should not be ignored. 
 
Table 4: Changes in the Publication Decision Process 
 
Change in the publication decision 
process over time 
Fourth Circuit 
(Number of judges) 
Seventh Circuit 
(Number of judges) 
Lesser tendency to publish 1  0 
Greater tendency to publish 4 1 
No change in tendency to publish 2 4 
Frequency of recommendations to 
other judges regarding publication 
  
Rarely or occasionally 6 5 
Never 1 0 
 
 
 251. For example, the second database used in The Behavior of Federal Judges was 
compiled by Cass Sunstein and others (Sunstein database) and includes “all the published 
court of appeals opinions from 1995 (plus some from earlier years) and 2001 in fourteen 
subject-matter areas believed to have significant ideological stakes, such as abortion, capital 
punishment, and racial discrimination.”  See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 39, at 157.  The 
authors, Epstein, Landes, and Posner updated the Sunstein database to 2008, adding age-
discrimination cases.  Id. 
 252. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
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